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Abstract— We study the detection of misbehavior in a Gaussian1
relay system, where the source transmits information to the desti-2
nation with the assistance of an amplify-and-forward relay node3
subject to unreliable channel state information (CSI). The relay4
node may be potentially malicious and corrupt the network by5
forwarding garbled information. In this situation, misleading6
feedback may take place, since reliable CSI is unavailable at7
the source and/or the destination. By classifying the action of8
the relay as detectable or undetectable, we propose a novel9
approach that is capable of coping with any malicious attack10
detected and continuing to work effectively in the presence of11
unreliable CSI. We demonstrate that the detectable class of12
attacks can be successfully detected with a high probability.13
Meanwhile, the undetectable class of attacks does not affect the14
performance improvements that are achievable by cooperative15
diversity, even though such an attack may fool the proposed16
detection approach. We also extend the method to deal with the17
case in which there is no direct link between the source and the18
destination. The effectiveness of the proposed approach has been19
validated by numerical results.20
Index Terms— Physical layer security, integrity check,21
unreliable CSI, cooperative relay communications.22
I. INTRODUCTION23
PHYSICAL layer security (PLS) is a promising technology24 that provides secure wireless transmissions by smartly25
exploiting imperfections of the communications medium [1].26
Cooperative relaying is beneficial for improving the coverage27
and transmission reliability of wireless systems [2], where28
single-antenna devices can form a virtual antenna array to29
provide cooperative spatial diversity [3], [4]. However, such30
benefits are attained only when the relays are trustworthy and31
always comply with cooperative protocols. In an adversarial32
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case, some relays might maliciously alter the information sent 33
by the source, thus degrading the performance of the relaying 34
system significantly. The dependence of cooperative systems 35
on the relays represents an inherent vulnerability [5]. There- 36
fore, early detection of misbehavior is essential to maintaining 37
the security of relaying systems and to combating malicious 38
attacks. 39
Traditionally, detection methods are based on cryptography 40
keys or authentication keys, requiring the source and the des- 41
tination to share a secret key [6]–[8]. The key-based detection 42
approach is far from ideal as it imposes a high computational 43
cost and needs a key distribution mechanism. Alternatively, 44
it is possible to detect malicious relays from the physical layer 45
perspective. In particular, Mao and Wu [9] proposed a cross- 46
layer detecting scheme, where pseudo-random tracing symbols 47
were inserted into information bits. To identify the malicious 48
relays, the destination measures the error probability of the 49
observed tracing symbols, according to their a priori ground 50
truth. In [10]–[12], Lo et al. applied a tracing-based method 51
to non-coherent detection in various scenarios, requiring no 52
channel state information (CSI). Note that the transmission 53
of tracing symbols also requires the support from a key- 54
distribution mechanism. Moreover, the performance of tracing- 55
based schemes is highly dependent on the number of tracing 56
symbols used, and an excessive number of them can signifi- 57
cantly reduce the bandwidth efficiency. 58
To avoid the use of external assistance, many detecting 59
schemes exploit ‘clean’ references stemming from the relaying 60
system itself. A ‘clean’ reference contains information that 61
has not been manipulated by the relay for sure. For example, 62
in the orthogonal frequency-division multiplexing (OFDM) 63
based detection scheme of [13], the source regards the trans- 64
mitted information as a reference. Thus, the misbehavior of 65
the relay is detected by examining the correlation between 66
the reference and the information that is forwarded by the 67
relay but overheard at the source. Detection schemes can 68
also be implemented at the destination [14], [15]. The direct 69
link between the source and the destination, as a ‘clean’ 70
reference to the relay link, is used to compare between two 71
different links to determine the relay behavior. However, these 72
schemes [9]–[15] assume that each malicious relay behaves 73
in an independent identically distributed (i.i.d.) manner of a 74
specific form. With respect to arbitrary i.i.d. attacks, Graves 75
and Wong [16] and Cao et al. [17] proposed a novel detection 76
approach in which the relay behavior is modeled as an attack 77
channel to check for any misbehavior. In [16], the source 78
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extracts the estimation of an attack channel based on its own79
transmitted and observed information. This detection method80
has been extended to the scenario in which a direct ‘clean’81
reference is unavailable [17]. However, [17] entirely depends82
on the source distribution. In [18], a detecting and tracing83
scheme for a multi-relay network was studied by partitioning84
the network into several sub-networks as described in [17].85
The detection schemes [9], [13]–[18] above are enabled86
under an ideal assumption that reliable CSI is known in87
advance. However, reliable CSI may not be available in prac-88
tice, especially when relays are malicious. For instance, mali-89
cious relays are reluctant to cooperate initially and, hence, they90
may deliberately manipulate the channel estimation process91
with ease. The whole system is then deceived into a state92
of unreliable CSI. In such cases, the previously mentioned93
schemes [9], [13]–[18] may be severely compromised. Con-94
sidering a point-to-point system, Tugnait [19] proposed a95
scheme to detect the pilot contamination attack, which causes96
unreliable CSI, by superimposing a random sequence on the97
training sequence and using source enumeration methods.98
In this paper, we consider a cooperative relaying system99
with a source-destination pair and a single relay employing100
an amplify and forward (AF) strategy [20]. The potentially101
malicious relay is capable of forwarding false information102
in an arbitrary i.i.d. manner. It can also provide unreliable103
CSI to degrade the system’s performance. Falsified forwarding104
together with the unreliable CSI makes the detection of misbe-105
havior very difficult. Our goal is to detect misbehavior based106
on physical-layer observations. The key difference between107
existing work [16]–[18] and ours is that we take into account108
that the channel estimation process may be compromised and109
hence the available CSI is unreliable. The main contribution110
of this paper is summarized as follows.111
1) We study the misbehavior of the malicious relay under112
the assumption that the misbehavior arises not only from113
falsified forwarding, but also from dishonest feedback.114
According to different combinations of misbehavior115
and from the detection point of the view, we define116
two mutually exclusive attack types – detectable and117
undetectable. We prove that a detectable attack can be118
detected asymptotically by examining the distance mea-119
sure between the distribution of physical-layer obser-120
vations and the distribution of the calculated received121
symbols. The proposed detection scheme needs no extra122
secret keys.123
2) We prove that an undetectable attack does not affect124
the bit error rate (BER) performance that is achiev-125
able by cooperative diversity, even though it cannot126
be identified. This implies that an undetectable attack127
hardly influences the reliability performance of the relay128
network, in the sense that the benefits of diversity gain129
are retained.130
3) For relay systems having direct links, we choose the131
direct link as a ‘clean’ reference. We then extend the132
proposed detection scheme to relay systems having no133
direct link, where the source distribution is known.134
Furthermore, in the absence of prior information of135
the source, we design a ‘clean’ reference by introduc-136
Fig. 1. A cooperative relay system consisting of a source-destination pair
and a potential malicious relay with direct link.
ing artificial noise (AN) to aid the proposed detection 137
scheme. 138
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. The 139
system model and the misbehavior types are described in 140
Section II. In Section III, we elaborate on the proposed 141
detection scheme for detectable attacks and prove that an 142
undetectable attack can achieve the same BER as a detectable 143
attack. The detection scheme is extended to the scenario in 144
which a direct link is absent in Section IV. Section V provides 145
numerical examples and discussions, and conclusions are 146
drawn in Section VI. 147
Notation: Upper and lower case letters denote, respectively, 148
random variables and their realizations. Sans-serif letters 149
denote general elements. | · | represents an absolute value 150
and ‖·‖ represents the Euclidean norm. The transpose of 151
the vector a is aT . For a sequence xN , both x[i] and xi 152
denote the i-th element in xN . X denotes the alphabet of X . 153
I(x[i] = x) is the indicator function denoting whether or not 154
x[i] is x. FXN (x) = 1/N
∑N
i=1 I(x[i] = x) is used to denote 155
the empirical distribution of xN , and implies the relative 156
proportion of occurrence of symbol x in xN . For a sequence 157
yN with consecutive values, the empirical distribution function 158
is trivially defined as FY N (t) = 1/N
∑N
i=1 I(y[i] < t). 159
In a similar fashion, we denote the conditional empirical 160
distribution as 161
FY N |XN (t|x) =
N∑
i=1
I(y[i] < t)I(x[i] = x)
N∑
i=1
I(x[i] = x)
. 162
II. SYSTEM MODEL 163
A. Cooperative Transmission 164
We consider a typical cooperative relay network consisting 165
of a source-destination pair and a potential malicious relay as 166
shown in Fig. 1, where the source (S) tries to send information 167
to the destination (D) with the aid of a relay node (R) and a 168
direct link (S-D link). A relay system without a direct link will 169
be considered in Section IV. Although this three-node relay 170
network model is simple, it is fundamental for studying relay 171
aided cooperative communications. Compared with traditional 172
non-cooperative networks, three-node relay networks can offer 173
several benefits, such as better connectivity, higher throughput 174
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and greater reliability [23]–[25]. The three-node relay network175
model can also be extended to more complicated network176
topology.177
In Fig. 1, the solid and dashed lines represent two trans-178
mission phases, i.e. phases 1 and 2, respectively. The wireless179
channels are assumed to be quasi-static in the same phase.180
1) Phase 1: S first broadcasts an N -length i.i.d. sequence181
XN simultaneously to R and D. Let U and Y1 be the symbols182
received at R and D, respectively. In the symbol-by-symbol183
expression, the time index is omitted. The received symbols184
in Phase 1 can be expressed as185
U = hsrX + Wsr , (1a)186
Y1 = hsdX + Wsd. (1b)187
2) Phase 2: R receives UN, processes it, and then forwards188
V N to D. Here, the symbol V is a processed version of the189
received symbol U . Due to the broadcast nature of wireless190
communication, S can overhear the forwarded information191
V N at the same moment. Let Y denote the received symbol192
overheard by S and Y2 denote the received symbol at D. The193
received symbols in Phase 2 are given by194
Y = hrsV + Wrs, (2a)195
Y2 = hrdV + Wrd, (2b)196
where hij is channel gain between node i and node j with197
i, j ∈ {S,R,D} and i = j. Statistically, we can model them as198
complex Gaussian random variables which capture the effects199
of pass loss and statistical fading in a wireless channel. The200
average transmit energy of the transmitted symbol is denoted201
as Es. Wij represents additive white Gaussian noise (AWGN)202
with variance N0 received at node j.203
CSI needs to be obtained from channel estimation. Before204
the transmission phases, all nodes participate in the channel205
estimation process. Since the malicious relay can manipulate206
the channel estimation process by sending incorrect pilot207
signals, unreliable CSI gij may be provided, which is different208
from the reliable CSI hij . Let g = {gsr, grs, grd} and209
h = {hsr, hrs, hrd} denote the set of the potentially unreliable210
CSI provided and the set of the corresponding reliable CSI,211
respectively. Note that the channel gain of the direct link212
cannot be manipulated by the relay, hence hsd is omitted from213
both of the CSI sets.214
B. Misbehavior Types215
The introduction of the relay opens a door to malicious216
attacks. Instead of complying with the cooperative strategy,217
a malicious relay node may exhibit misbehaviors both in the218
transmission phases and in the channel estimation process.219
Hence, potentially both the information forwarded and the220
CSI provided can be manipulated by the malicious relay.221
We identify the following two types of misbehaviors.222
1) Falsified Forwarding: the relay receives UN in Phase223
1, and then corrupts it into another sequence V N to be224
forwarded in Phase 2. If we assume that the malicious225
relay misbehaves in an arbitrary i.i.d. manner, the for-226
warded sequence V N will obey an arbitrary stochastic227
distribution conditioned on UN . From the perspective of 228
symbol-by-symbol, the relay processing behavior can be 229
characterized by its conditional probability density func- 230
tion (PDF) fV |U (v|u). It is not difficult to derive that if 231
the relay forwards the received symbol U accurately, 232
the conditional PDF is 233
fV |U (v|u) = δ(v − u), (3) 234
where δ(·) is the impulse function. This means that when 235
U = V the relay is amicable with respect to forwarding 236
information. Otherwise, the relay is exhibiting falsified 237
forwarding, also known as a Byzantine attack. 238
2) Dishonest Feedback: In many wireless communication 239
protocols, the transmitter obtains the CSI estimate from 240
the receiver’s feedback. The malicious node is capable 241
of dominating the channel estimation process deliber- 242
ately. In this case the CSI provided may be unreliable. 243
The unreliable CSI provides a malicious node with an 244
opportunity to undermine relay selection, e.g., to select 245
a malicious node as a qualified relay. Further, the des- 246
tination node may combine the information received 247
from the relay and the source inappropriately, due to the 248
unreliable CSI. The CSI provided is said to be reliable 249
if g = h. Otherwise, the relay node is considered to be 250
initiating dishonest feedback that creates unreliable CSI. 251
Note that imperfect CSI is usually caused by channel 252
estimation error, which is an objective measurement 253
error rather than a deliberate attack. Imperfect CSI does 254
not belong to the scope of physical layer security. Thus, 255
imperfect CSI is not considered in this paper. 256
Thus we can employ the parameter pair (fV |U ,g) to describe 257
the behavior of the relay. Maliciousness due to the misbehavior 258
is defined as follows. 259
Definition 1 (Maliciousness of Misbehavior): The relay 260
is considered as cooperative if and only if the pair 261
(fV |U ,g) belongs to the set {fV |U (v|u),g|fV |U (v|u) = 262
δ(v − u),g = h.}; otherwise, the relay is considered as 263
malicious. 264
It is obvious that neither of the above forms of misbehavior 265
is allowed for a cooperative relay. Our goal is to use physical- 266
layer observations to detect maliciousness if and when misbe- 267
havior occurs in the relay system. 268
III. DETECTION APPROACH 269
In this section, we describe the proposed approach for 270
detecting maliciousness in a relay system with a direct link, 271
i.e., falsified forwarding and/or dishonest feedback, but first 272
we introduce the concept of detectability of maliciousness. 273
A. Maliciousness Detectability 274
The source S can observe the symbol Y in Phase 2 (see (2)). 275
The symbol Y goes through a real S-R-S link, which may 276
be manipulated by a malicious relay. For S, the transmitted 277
symbol X offers a ‘clean’ reference. 278
On one hand, we use the conditional likelihood function 279
fY |X(y|x; fV |U ,h) =
∫ +∞
−∞
∫ +∞
−∞
fU|X(u|x;hsr) 280
× fV |U (v|u)fY |V (y|v;hrs) dudv (4) 281
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Fig. 2. Markov chain of S-R-S link and S-R-D link.
to characterize S-R-S link, where the parameters fV |U and h282
are unknown for S.283
On the other hand, S also tries to make use of the CSI284
provided, g, even though it may be unreliable. The conditional285
PDF at S is computed as286
f0Y |X(y|x;g)287
=
∫ +∞
−∞
∫ +∞
−∞
fU|X(u|x; gsr)δ(v − u)fY |V (y|v; grs) dudv288
=
∫ +∞
−∞
fU|X(u|x; gsr)fY |V (y|u; grs) du, (5)289
where the superscript distinguishes the conditional PDF290
f0Y |X(y|x;g) from the conditional likelihood function291
fY |X(y|x; fV |U ,h). Whenever there is no ambiguity, we will292
employ such a notation, i.e. f0Y |X(y|x) and fY |X(y|x), for sim-293
plicity. It is observed that the relay is considered to faithfully294
forward as fV |U (v|u) = δ(v − u) appears in the expression295
for f0Y |X(y|x).296
Since (X,U, V, Y ) forms a Markov chain as X → U →297
V → Y , we have four cases according to different combina-298
tions of the parameter pair (fV |U ,g), as follows:299
1) fV |U = δ(v − u) ∩ g = h; full cooperative relay (no300
misbehavior), we have fY |X(y|x) = f0Y |X(y|x).301
2) fV |U = δ(v−u) ∩ g = h; malicious relay with falsified302
forwarding, we have fY |X(y|x) = f0Y |X(y|x).303
3) fV |U = δ(v−u)∩g = h; malicious relay with dishonest304
feedback, we have fY |X(y|x) = f0Y |X(y|x).305
4) fV |U = δ(v − u) ∩ g = h; malicious relay with306
both misbehaviors. This is difficult to analyse as it is307
hard to determine the equivalence of fY |X(y|x) and308
f0Y |X(y|x).309
As shown in Fig. 2 (a), it is easy to check the relationship310
between fY |X(y|x) and f0Y |X(y|x) in the four different cases.311
The first three are easily determined, but Case 4) is a demand-312
ing problem. From the above, based on the parameter pair313
(fV |U ,g), the inequality of fY |X(y|x) and f0Y |X(y|x) is a314
sufficient condition to determine misbehavior.315
TABLE I
THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN DEFINITION 1 AND DEFINITION 2
This conclusion helps to detect misbehavior in the relaying 316
system considered. We define a set T1 as: 317
T1 :=
{
fV |U , {gsr, grs}
∣
∣
∣fY |X(y|x) = f0Y |X(y|x)
}
. (6) 318
If T1 holds, there must be misbehavior in the S-R-S link; 319
unfortunately we cannot jump to a conclusion of no misbehav- 320
ior if T1 does not hold, owing to Case 4. Thus, T1 is referred 321
to as the detectable set of the parameter pair (fV |U ,g) in the 322
S-R-S link; correspondingly, the complementary set T1c of T1 323
is called the undetectable set of the parameter pair (fV |U ,g) 324
in the S-R-S link. 325
In order to fully check the parameter pair (fV |U ,g), 326
an S-R-D link should be included. For the S-R-D link, the set 327
T2 is defined as 328
T2 :=
{
fV |U , {gsr, grd}
∣
∣
∣fY2|Y1(y2|y1) = f0Y2|Y1(y2|y1)
}
, 329
(7) 330
where fY2|Y1(y2|y1) and f0Y2|Y1(y2|y1) are, respectively, 331
the likelihood function and PDF of the symbol Y2 received 332
at D from the relay link conditioned on the symbol Y1 333
received from the direct link. T2 and its complementary set 334
T c2 are referred to as, respectively, the detectable set and the 335
undetectable set of the parameter pair (fV |U ,g) in the S-R-D 336
link. Fig.2 (b) helps to check the detectable set T2 directly. 337
The parameter pair (fV |U ,g) is completely partitioned by 338
combinations of T1 and T2. We call T = T1
⋃
T2 as the 339
detectable class, in which misbehavior is inevitable. It is 340
emphasized that the complementary set T c = T c1
⋂
T c2 of 341
T implies that the behavior can be cooperative or malicious. 342
Thus, attack types can be given by the following definition. 343
Definition 2 (Attack Types): If the parameter pair 344
(fV |U ,g) belongs to the detectable class T , misbehavior is 345
certain, and this is called a detectable attack; if T c holds 346
and the relay is malicious, the resulting misbehavior is called 347
an undetectable attack. 348
From Definition 2, it is seen that detectable attacks map 349
directly to the detectable class, whereas undetectable attacks 350
map only to a subset of the undetectable class. An undetectable 351
attack demands that falsified forwarding and dishonest feed- 352
back occur simultaneously, but the attack is not detected by a 353
given detection approach. The undetectable attack is a small 354
probability event compared to the detectable attack, because 355
the undetectable attack is required to satisfy stricter conditions. 356
It is emphasized that the undetectable attack is still in an 357
infinite set. Table I illustrates the relationship between Defin- 358
ition 1 and Definition 2, where ∅ denotes the empty set. The 359
action of the relay, i.e., the parameter pair (fV |U ,g), can be 360
fully classified by use of Definitions 1 and 2. A detectable 361
attack results from the overlap of these two definitions, and the 362
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identification of a detectable attack is precisely equivalent to363
the identification of the detectable class T .364
B. Identification of a Detectable Attack365
As the detectable class T involves both T1 and T2, detection366
is implemented at the source node and at the destination367
node. In order to quantify the consecutive received symbols,368
it is convenient to use an n′-length sequence (t1, t2, · · · , tn′)369
satisfying a = t1 < t2 < t3 · · · < tn′ = b, where the370
quantization range [a, b] depends on n′. Further, we con-371
sider the quantization interval Δ = b−an′−1 to be such that372
limn′→∞Δ = 0.373
1) Decision Metric at S: The detection at S focuses on the374
S-R-S link, in which the source uses its transmitted symbols as375
a reference to check whether or not action of the relay node376
is in the detectable set T1. We employ the empirical CDF377
to approximate the likelihood function fY |X(y|x). By jointly378
considering the transmitted and received signal sequences379
(XN , Y N ), the conditional empirical CDF FY N |XN (t|x) at S380
is written as381
FY N |XN (t|x) =
N∑
i=1
I(y[i] < t)I(x[i] = x)
N∑
i=1
I(x[i] = x)
. (8)382
Naturally, a statistical decision metric DN1 is expressed as383
DN1 =
1
n′
n′∑
m=1
∣
∣
∣FY N |XN (tm|x)− F 0Y |X(tm|x)
∣
∣
∣, (9)384
where F 0Y |X(tm|x) is the CDF of f0Y |X(tm|x) as given in (5).385
2) Decision Metric at D: The detection at D is related to386
the security of the S-R-D link and takes place at the same387
time as the detection at S. Since D receives the signal Y N1 in388
Phase 1 (see (1)) and then the signal Y N2 in Phase 2 (see (2)),389
the likelihood function fY2|X(y2|x; fV |U ,h) characterizing the390
S-R-D link can be obtained as391
fY2|X(y2|x; fV |U ,h)392
=
∫ +∞
−∞
∫ +∞
−∞
fU|X(u|x;hsr)fV |U (v|u)fY2|V (y2|v;hrd) dudv.393
(10)394
However, unlike S, D is inaccessible to the transmitted sig-395
nal XN . The received signal Y N1 in the direct link is exploited396
as a ‘clean’ reference for the detection at D. (Y1, X, Y2) forms397
a Markov chain as Y1 → X → Y2, and Y1 and Y2 are condi-398
tionally independent for a given X , so the likelihood function399
conditioned on Y1 ≤ t can be mathematically expressed as400
fY2|Y1(y2|t; fV |U ,h)401
=
∫ t
−∞
∑
x∈X
fY1|X(y1|x)fY2|X(y2|x; fV |U ,h) Pr(X = x) dy1402
/∫ t
−∞
∑
x∈X
fY1|X(y1|x) Pr(X = x) dy1. (11)403
Since the conditional PDF at D f0Y2|X(y2|x;g) is computed as 404
f0Y2|X(y2|x;g) =
∫ +∞
−∞
fU|X(u|x; gsr)fY2|V (y2|v; grd) du, 405
(12) 406
the conditional PDF f0Y2|Y1(y2|t;g) can be formulated as 407
f0Y2|Y1(y2|t;g) 408
=
∫ t
−∞
∑
x∈X
fY1|X(y1|x)f0Y2|X(y2|x;g) Pr(X = x) dy1 409
/∫ t
−∞
∑
x∈X
fY1|X(y1|x) Pr(X = x) dy1. (13) 410
For ease of presentation, fY2|Y1(y2|y1; fV |U ,h) and 411
f0Y2|Y1(y2|y1;g) are written as fY2|Y1(y2|y1) and f0Y2|Y1(y2|y1) 412
in the section below. 413
Based on the pair of received signals (Y N1 , Y N2 ), the empir- 414
ical conditional CDF FY N2 |Y N1 (s|t) can be expressed as 415
FY N2 |Y N1 (s|t) =
N∑
i=1
I(y1[i] < t)I(y2[i] < s)
N∑
i=1
I(y1[i] < t)
. (14) 416
By employing FY N2 |Y N1 (s|t), the statistical decision metric DN2 417
for the detection at D is given by 418
DN2 =
1
n′2
n′∑
p=1
n′∑
q=1
∣
∣
∣FY N2 |Y N1 (tp|tq)− F
0
Y2|Y1(tp|tq)
∣
∣
∣ , (15) 419
where F 0Y2|Y1(tp|tq) is the CDF of f0Y2|Y1(tp|tq) as given 420
in (13). 421
3) Detection: After obtaining the decision statistical metrics 422
DN1 and DN2 , we first identify whether the action of the 423
relay falls into the detectable class T or not. The following 424
proposition will show how DN1 and DN2 identify, respectively, 425
the detectable sets T1 in the S-R-S link and T2 in the S-R-D 426
link. 427
Proposition 1 (Detection at S and D): In the S-R-S link, T1 428
can be detected by DN1 at S; in the S-R-D link, T2 can be 429
detected by DN2 at D. For i = 1, 2, the two decision metrics 430
DN1 and DN2 have the following properties: 431
i) lim
N→∞
Pr
(
DNi > ρ1
∣
∣
∣ (fV |U ,g) ∈ Ti
)
= 1, when 432
Pr
(
(fV |U ,g) ∈ Ti
)
> 0, 433
ii) lim
N→∞
Pr
(
DNi > ρ2
∣
∣
∣ (fV |U ,g) ∈ T ci
)
= 0, when 434
Pr
(
(fV |U ,g) ∈ T ci
)
> 0, where ρ1 and ρ2 are strictly 435
positive, and can be arbitrary small. 436
Proof: See Appendix A. 437
Remark 1: Take the detection at S for example. From (6), 438
the detectable set T1 implies that the likelihood function 439
fY |X(y|x) differs from the conditional PDF f0Y |X(y|x). 440
According to the law of large numbers, the empirical distribu- 441
tion FY N |XN approaches the CDF of fY |X(y|x) as N →∞. 442
From the proof of Proposition 1, we can see that DN1 uses 443
FY N |XN as the bridge to measure the ‘distance’ between 444
fY |X(y|x) and f0Y |X(y|x). 445
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Remark 2: Proposition 1 points out that, if the behavior446
of the relay follows the undetectable set T ci , i = 1, 2, then447
DNi → 0. Otherwise, it is probable that the source is capable448
of identifying a detectable attack. In addition, the missed449
detection and false alarm probabilities of DNi can be arbitrary450
small as N →∞.451
Combining the detection at S with the detection at D,452
the detectable class T can be identified by the proposed453
Algorithm 1 below.454
Algorithm 1 The Identification Procedure for a Detectable
Attack
1: Initialization: Select appropriate N and n′, and receive the
CSI set g.
2: Calculate the decision metrics: S computes DN1 based on
(XN , Y N ), and D computes DN2 based on (Y N1 , Y N2 )
simultaneously.
3: if DN1 → 0 ∩DN2 → 0 then
4: (fV |U ,g) ∈ T c1
⋂
T c2 , the action of the relay belongs to
the undetectable class T c.
5: else
6: (fV |U ,g) ∈ T1
⋃
T2, the action of the relay belongs to
the detectable class T .
7: end if
According to Algorithm 1, if the action of the relay belongs455
to the detectable class, we draw a conclusion immediately that456
the relay is suffering from a malicious attack; if the action of457
the relay belongs to the undetectable class, we cannot decide458
whether the relay is suffering from a malicious attack or not.459
C. Signal Detection of the Undetectable Class460
According to Definitions 1 and 2, we know that unde-461
tectable class consists of undetectable attacks and cooperative462
(or friendly) relays. In other words, if falsified forwarding and463
dishonest feedback occur simultaneously, it is possible that464
an undetectable attack has the same statistical behavior as a465
cooperative relay. Thus, we cannot identify whether a mali-466
cious attack is occurring by use of Algorithm 1; consequently,467
a malicious relay that is performing an undetectable attack468
can disguise itself as a cooperative one – from the signal469
processing point of view, the performance of an undetectable470
attack is the same as that of the cooperative relay. On the471
assumption of an i.i.d. attack, the undetectable attack can be472
neglected.473
At D, maximum-likelihood (ML) demodulation is used,474
based on the CSI g. Following (1) and (13), the sym-475
bols received from the direct link and the relay link are476
re-expressed as477
{
Y1 = hsdX + Wsd,
Y2 = gsrgrdX + grdWsr + Wrd,
478
which are written in vector form as Y = HX + W,479
with Y =
[
Y1, Y2
]T
, H =
[
hsd, gsrgrd
]T
and W =480
[
Wsd, grdWsr + Wrd
]T
.481
Fig. 3. A cooperative relay system consisting of a source-destination pair
and a potential malicious relay without direct link.
ML detection is then performed as 482
Xˆ = argmax
X∈X
Pr(Y|X) = argmin
X∈X
‖Y −HX‖2. (16) 483
From (16), the joint PDF of Y, fY1,Y2|X(y1, y2|x; fV |U ,h), 484
only effects ML detection. Then the following proposition 485
gives a property of the undetectable class T c. 486
Proposition 2: If the parameter pair (fV |U ,g) 487
belongs to the undetectable class T c, then there exists 488
fY1,Y2|X(y1, y2|x; fV |U ,h) = f0Y1,Y2|X(y1, y2|x;g) regardless 489
of whether there is an undetectable attack or cooperative 490
behavior. 491
Proof: See Appendix B. 492
Remark 3: Essentially Proposition 2 identifies that, if the 493
action of the relay belongs to the undetectable class T c, 494
the distributions of the received symbols from the direct 495
link and the relay link are subject to the same joint PDF 496
f0Y1,Y2|X(y1, y2|x;g). Therefore, ML detection has the same 497
outcome irrespective of whether it arises from an undetectable 498
attack or from cooperative behavior. 499
In terms of the signal detection performance, an unde- 500
tectable attack is no worse than cooperative behavior. This 501
implies that, for the undetectable attack, the symbols received 502
can be properly demodulated as if they resulted from coop- 503
erative behavior. That is, although the undetectable attack 504
cannot be identified by Algorithm 1, a relay system with an 505
undetectable attack can still deliver the same diversity order 506
performance as a relay system with cooperative behavior. The 507
symbol error rate (SER) for the undetectable attack in the high 508
signal-to-noise ratio (SNR) region is approximated as [21] 509
Pr(e)
high-SNR	 3
Kγ2
, (17) 510
where K = |gsr|(|gsd|+|grd|)|gsd||grd| , and γ = Es/N0 is SNR 511
without fading. It is observed that the diversity order of the 512
undetectable attack is 2. 513
An undetectable attack involves the collusion between fal- 514
sified forwarding and the dishonest feedback. This escapes 515
detection because the damage caused by the falsified forward- 516
ing is mitigated by the dishonest feedback. This intuitively 517
explains why, for an undetectable attack, the malicious relay 518
can still be used to maintain the cooperative diversity. 519
IV. RELAY SYSTEM WITHOUT A DIRECT LINK 520
In this section we extend our consideration from relay 521
systems with a direct link to those without a direct link 522
between the S and the D due to coverage, as shown in Fig. 3. 523
While the detection at S is unaffected as the S-R-S link 524
is still present, in the absence of a direct link as a ‘clean’ 525
reference, the approach proposed in Section III-B cannot be 526
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applied immediately. We must develop a new detection method527
at D that can be used for relay systems without a direct link.528
We first repeat the two-phase transmission. Here, the nota-529
tion is consistent with earlier sections.530
In Phase 1, S sends XN to R (solid line in Fig. 3).531
The symbol received at R, U , is written as532
U = hsrX + Wsr. (18)533
R processes the UN received using AF protocol, generates534
V N and then forwards it in Phase 2 (dashed line in Fig. 3).535
The symbol received at D is expressed as536
Y2 = hrdV + Wrd, (19)537
where for i, j ∈ {S,R,D}, i = j, hij is the channel gain538
between node i and node j, and Wij is the Gaussian noise539
at node j with variance N0. Definition 1 still applies to this540
relay system, while Definition 2 is changed according to the541
following cases.542
A. Known Source Distribution543
If the source distribution is known, we can use a simple544
extension of the previous detection approach based on a direct545
link. The reliable CSI set is denoted as h = {hsr, hrs, hrd}546
and the CSI set provided is denoted as g = {gsr, grs, grd}.547
Since the S-R-S link remains unchanged, T1 can still be548
checked by the detection at S. However, the detection at D549
will be modified based on the known source distribution.550
The likelihood function is given by551
fY2(y2; fV |U ,h) =
∑
x∈X
fY2|X(y2|x; fV |U ,h) Pr(X), (20)552
where fY2|X(y2|x; fV |U ,h) is given in (10), and the condi-553
tional PDF is expressed as554
f0Y2(y;g) =
∑
x∈X f
0
Y2|X(y|x;g) Pr(X), (21)555
where f0Y2|X(y|x;g) is given in (12).556
According to (20) and (21), T2 is redefined as557
T2 :=
{
fV |U , {gsr, grd}
∣
∣fY2(y2; fV |U ,h) = f0Y2(y2;g)
}
.558
By observing the received sequence Y N , the empirical CDF559
at D is given by560
FY N2 (t) =
1
N
N∑
i=1
I(y2[i] < t). (22)561
From (20), (21) and (22), the decision metric DN2 in (15) is562
modified to563
DN2 =
1
n′2
∑n′
m=1
∣
∣
∣FY N2 (tm)− F 0Y2(tm)
∣
∣
∣, (23)564
where F 0Y2(t) is the CDF of f
0
Y2
(t;g) given in (21).565
By employing this new DN2 , together with (9), Algorithm 1566
can deal with the detection of misbehavior for relay systems567
without direct links, based on a known source distribution.568
Fig. 4. A cooperative relay system with added artificial noise, where the
solid and dashed lines denote Phase 1 and Phase 2, respectively.
B. Unknown Source Distribution 569
If the source distribution is unknown to the relay system, 570
the destination has no access to any ‘clean’ reference, since 571
all physical layer observations tend to be manipulated. Adding 572
auxiliary information can help to detect pilot contamination 573
attack [19]. We employ additive AN to assist in building 574
trustworthy reference information. 575
Traditionally, AN is designed to lie in the null space of 576
the main channel [22], and it is exploited to degrade an 577
eavesdropper’s channel so that a secure capacity is guaranteed. 578
In this paper, instead of using the traditional design of AN, 579
we propose a different type of AN, as described below. 580
1) The structure of AN requires that the source is equipped 581
with multiple antennas. Single-antenna nodes can emu- 582
late a distributed multi-antenna array. By executing a 583
two-way communication protocol (see Fig. 4), the source 584
and the destination simultaneously send information to 585
the relay, thus the condition of forming AN can be 586
satisfied. 587
2) The AN is defined as the product of coefficient matrix 588
C and key vector k. Then, the AN is denoted as Ck, 589
where C = diag{c1, c2} and k = [k1, k2]T . 590
3) According to the two-way communication protocol, 591
the AN lies in the null space of the provided CSI vector 592
gr = [gsr, gdr]T so that gTr Ck = 0. 593
4) For a given C, when gr is known and ‖k‖ = 1, the AN 594
is deterministic rather than random. 595
5) The AN changes with time, which takes place when the 596
coefficient matrix C changes. 597
6) Conventionally, the wiretap channel is assumed to be 598
uncorrelated with the main channel, which implies 599
hTr Ck = 0. This assumption is invalid in the case 600
considered, because gr represents unreliable CSI that 601
can be of any value. For example, the dishonest feedback 602
can allow gr to be correlated with hr, say, gr = αhr 603
for α = 1. Then, we have hTr Ck = 0 and AN will fail. 604
Therefore, our analysis of the dishonest feedback covers 605
two separate cases: gr is either correlated or uncorre- 606
lated with hr. 607
In Phase 1, both S and D send AN Ck simultaneously. 608
The signal received at R is expressed as 609
U = hTr Ck + Wr, (24) 610
where hr = [hsr, hdr]T . Wr is Gaussian noise at R with 611
variance N0. 612
In Phase 2, R receives UN and then forwards a processed 613
version, V N , to S and D due to the broadcast nature of a 614
wireless channel. The signals received at S and at D are 615
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written as616
Y1 = hrsV + Wrs, (25a)617
Y2 = hrdV + Wrd, (25b)618
where hrs and hrd are channel gains, and Wrs and Wrd are619
Gaussian noise with variance N0 at S and at R, respectively.620
In the channel estimation process, R can know the CSI of621
both the S-R link and the D-R link, as S and D send pilot622
signals to R. Then, due to dishonest feedback, R broadcasts the623
potentially unreliable CSI, instead of the valid one, to S and D.624
When the unreliable CSI is obtained at S and D, the proposed625
AN-aided scheme comes into play.626
Because of the symmetry of the system considered, we show627
the detection results from a source perspective, and the con-628
ditional likelihood function is given by629
fY1(y1; fV |U ,h)630
=
∫ +∞
−∞
∫ +∞
−∞
fU (u;hsr)fV |U (v|u)fY1|V (y1|v;hrs) dudv,631
(26)632
where h = [hsr, hdr, hrs, hrd] is the reliable CSI set. The633
conditional PDF is formulated as634
f0Y1(y1;g)635
=
∫ +∞
−∞
∫ +∞
−∞
fU (u; gsr)δ(v − u)fY1|V (y1|v; grs) dudv636
=
∫ +∞
−∞
fU (u; gsr)fY1|V (y1|u; grs) du, (27)637
where g = [gsr, gdr, grs, grd] is the CSI set provided, with638
fY2(y2; fV |U ,h) and f0Y2(y2;g) being expressed in the similar639
way.640
We discuss the four cases of the parameter pair (fV |U ,g)641
as follows.642
1) fV |U = δ(v − u) ∩ g = h. It is easy to obtain643
fY1(y1; fV |U ,h) = f0Y1(y1;g).644
2) fV |U = δ(v − u) ∩ g = h. First, we have645
fU (u;hsr) = fU (u; gsr) since AN is nulled out; then646
we have fY1(y1; fV |U ,h) = f0Y1(y1;g) because fV |U =647
δ(v − u) and fY1|V (y1|v;hrs) = fY1|V (y1|v; grs).648
3) • fV |U = δ(v − u) ∩ g = h ∩ gr = αhr,649
for α = 1.650
According to (26) and (27), we have651
fY1(y1; fV |U ,h) = f0Y1(y1;g) as hTr Ck = 0.652
• fV |U = δ(v − u) ∩ g = h ∩ gr = αhr,653
for α = 1.654
It is observed that Ck lies in the null space of hr,655
so hTr Ck = 0; if g = h but grs = hrs, we have656
fY1(y1; fV |U ,h) = f0Y1(y1;g).657
4) • fV |U = δ(v − u) ∩ g = h ∩ gr = αhr,658
for α = 1.659
The two types of misbehavior have the potential660
to make fY1(y1; fV |U ,h) = f0Y1(y1;g). By arti-661
ficially operating C, hTr Ck changes over time662
and cannot be bounded by i.i.d. attack manner –663
fY1(y1; fV |U ,h) = f0Y1(y1;g) may hold for some664
Cs with the specific pair (fV |U ,g), but it does not665
hold when C changes. In general, we must have 666
fY1(y1; fV |U ,h) = f0Y1(y1;g) by using a time- 667
varying coefficient matrix C. 668
• fV |U = δ(v − u) ∩ g = h ∩ gr = αhr, 669
for α = 1. 670
The matrix C fails to change hTr Ck as Ck lies 671
in the null space of hr. It is possible to obtain 672
fY1(y1; fV |U ,h) = f
0
Y1
(y1;g) with the specific pair 673
(fV |U ,g), which we will discuss later. 674
From the above discussion, if gr = αhr for α = 1, 675
a sufficient condition to determine misbehavior of the relay 676
is that (fV |U ,g) makes fY1(y1; fV |U ,h) = f0Y1(y1;g). When 677
gr = αhr for α = 1, it is still possible that fY1(y1; fV |U ,h) = 678
f0Y1(y1;g), because AN Ck fails to enable the distribution Y1 679
to distinguish fY1(y1; fV |U ,h) from f0Y1(y1;g). To address 680
this, we modify the AN Ck to C˜k˜, where gTr C˜k˜ = 0. There- 681
fore, for the second case of 3), the introduction of C˜k˜ means 682
that fY1(y1; fV |U ,h) = f0Y1(y1;g). However, for the sec- 683
ond case of 4), it is still possible that fY1(y1; fV |U ,h) = 684
f0Y1(y1;g). 685
As previously, we define 686
TAN1 :=
{
fV |U ,g
∣
∣fY1(y1; fV |U ,h) = f0Y1(y1;g)
}
, 687
and 688
TAN2 :=
{
fV |U ,g
∣
∣fY2(y2; fV |U ,h) = f0Y2(y2;g)
}
. 689
TAN = TAN1
⋃
TAN2 is referred to as the detectable class, 690
and its complement, T cAN , as the undetectable class. 691
1) To identify the detectable class TAN , we need detection 692
at both S and D. For j = 1, 2, based on the received 693
sequences Y N1 and Y N2 , the empirical CDFs at S and at 694
D are given by 695
FY Nj (t) =
1
N
N∑
i=1
I(y2[i] < t). (28) 696
Similarly, for j = 1, 2, the decision metric DNj is 697
written as 698
DNj =
1
n′2
n′∑
m=1
∣
∣
∣FY Nj (tm)− F
0
Yj (tm)
∣
∣
∣, (29) 699
where F 0Yj (t) is the CDF of f
0
Yj
(t;g). The identifica- 700
tion procedure of the detectable attack is elaborated in 701
Algorithm 2. 702
2) We now focus on the undetectable class T cAN . From the 703
expression of f0Y2(y2;g), Y2 is formulated as 704
Y2 = grd(Wr + MgTr C˜k˜) + Wrd, (30) 705
where M is the number of occurrences of C˜k˜ in an 706
N -length block (usually taken to be N/3). Specifically, 707
by setting C˜ = diag{1/αM, 0} and k˜ = [X, 0]T when 708
gr = αhr, (30) is rewritten as 709
Y2 = grd(Wr + hsrX) + Wrd, (31) 710
According to the definition of TAN2, we have 711
fY2(y2; fV |U ,h) = f0Y2(y2;g). Following the same logic 712
as in Section III-C, the signal detection performance 713
IEE
E P
ro
of
LV et al.: PHYSICAL DETECTION OF MISBEHAVIOR IN RELAY SYSTEMS WITH UNRELIABLE CSI 9
Fig. 5. The empirical CDFs of DN1 and DN2 for the four detectable attacks considered.
Algorithm 2 The Identification Procedure for Attack
Detection With Aided AN
1: Initialization: generate coefficient matrices C1, C2 and C˜
and give the CSI set g.
2: Calculate AN: compute k1, k2, and k˜ based on C1, C2,
and C˜, respectively.
3: Add AN: take turns adding C1k1, C2k2 and C˜k˜ at S and
D in each instant.
4: Calculate decision metric: DN1 and DN2 are computed at S
and at D, respectively.
5: if DN1 → 0 ∩DN2 → 0 then
6: The relay action is a member of the undetectable class
T cAN .
7: else
8: The relay action belongs to the detectable class TAN –
the relay must be misbehaving.
9: end if
of the undetectable attack is the same as that of the714
cooperative scenario.715
V. NUMERICAL EXAMPLES716
A. Relay Systems With a Direct Link717
As illustration, we present here both detectable and unde-718
tectable attacks; we also evaluate the effectiveness of the719
proposed approach in identifying the two types of attack.720
1) Detectable Attack: We consider a the relay system shown721
in Fig. 1, with S transmitting a BPSK signal with unit energy.722
Assume that the reliable CSI set h = [1, 1, 1], the AWGN vari-723
ance N0 = 0.01, and the direct link channel gain hsd = 0.8.724
The block length was selected to have N = 1000, and for725
quantization purposes n′ = 100, −a = b = √n′/2, which726
implies that Δ = 1/
√
n′.727
To verify the effectiveness of the proposed detection728
schemes, the following four detectable malicious attacks were729
considered:730
• CASE 1 - Dishonest Feedback: The relay provides an 731
unreliable CSI with g = [0.6, 0.8, 0.7]. 732
• CASE 2 - Falsified Forwarding I: The relay actively 733
injects Gaussian noise distributed with N (0, 0.04). 734
• CASE 3 - Falsified Forwarding II: The relay intention- 735
ally adds noise with uniform distribution U(−1,+1). 736
• CASE 4 - Mixed Attack: Both dishonest feedback and 737
falsified forwarding are considered in this case; the relay 738
injects Gaussian noise distributed with N (0, 0.0025) and 739
provides g = [0.9, 0.9, 1]. 740
Fig. 5 shows the empirical CDFs of DN1 and DN2 after 741
800 computer simulation runs for each of the above cases. It 742
can be observed that there is a clear separation between the 743
undetectable class and the detectable class; this can be used 744
as a threshold (e.g. δ = 0.005 for the detection at S) for 745
identifying the detectable class. These results further verify 746
the effectiveness of Proposition 1. 747
2) Undetectable Attack: We assume that the reliable CSI 748
h = [1,
√
2/2,
√
2/2] and the CSI provided g = [
√
2/2, 1, 1], 749
and that the malicious relay performs falsified forwarding by 750
injecting Gaussian noise distributed with N (0, 0.01). Fig. 6 751
shows the empirical CDFs of DN1 and DN2 for cooperative 752
behavior and an undetectable attack. It is evident that the 753
cooperative behavior and the undetectable attack are not 754
distinguishable. 755
3) BER Performance in the Presence of an Undetectable 756
Attack: We assume that the channel gain of the direct link 757
hsd = 0.4 and the injected noise power (falsified forwarding) 758
is set at the same level as N0. Fig. 7 illustrates the BER 759
performance versus SNR for different noise powers; the unde- 760
tectable attack is seen to have the same BER performance 761
as both cooperative behaviour and direct transmission from S 762
to D. These results verify the previous claim that, even for 763
undetectable attacks, the diversity gain is maintained. 764
B. Systems Without a Direct Link 765
1) Detectable Attack: The source transmits BPSK signals 766
and the reliable CSI is set as h = [1/2, 1/3, 1/2, 1/2]. 767
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Fig. 6. The empirical CDFs of DN1 and DN2 for the undetectable attack considered.
Fig. 7. BER performance comparisons among cooperative behavior, the unde-
tectable class, and direct transmission.
The coefficient matrices are C1 =
[−1 0
0 2
]
, C2 =
[
2 0
0 −1
]
768
and C˜ =
[
1 0
0 0
]
. Correspondingly, k1 = [2/
√
5, 1/
√
5]T ,769
k2 = [1/
√
5, 2/
√
5]T and k˜ = [1, 0]T . N0 = 1/
√
5. The770
block length is chosen to have N = 1000 and, for quantization771
purposes, n′ = 100, −a = b = √n′/2, which implies that772
Δ = 1/
√
n′. The three different cases are discussed below.773
• CASE 1 - Dishonest Feedback: The relay provides the774
unreliable CSI g = [1/2, 1/2, 1/3, 1/3].775
• CASE 2 - Malicious Forwarding I: The relay actively776
injects Gaussian noise distributed with N (0, 1/√5).777
• CASE 3 - Mixed Attack: We consider both dishonest778
feedback and falsified forwarding, where the relay injects779
Gaussian noise distributed with N (0, 1/√5) and provides780
g = [1/3, 1/3, 1/2, 1/2].781
Fig. 8 shows the empirical CDFs of Dn1 after 800 computer782
simulation runs, in each of the three cases. The proposed783
decision metric is clearly capable of distinguishing between784
the detectable and undetectable classes.785
Fig. 8. The empirical CDFs of DN1 for the three detectable attacks
considered.
Fig. 9. The empirical CDFs of DN1 for the undetectable attack considered.
2) Undetectable Attacks: We consider the previously 786
described simulation model with a different g = [1/4, 1/6, 787
1/4, 1/4], and gr = αhr for α = 1/2. The malicious 788
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relay conducts falsified forwarding by injecting Gaussian noise789
distributed with N (0, 1/√5). Fig. 9 demonstrates that it is790
impossible to differentiate between cooperative behavior and791
an undetectable attack.792
VI. CONCLUSION793
This paper has investigated the problem of detecting mali-794
cious attacks in a two-hop AF relay network in the pres-795
ence of an unreliable CSI. In particular, we have proposed796
a detection approach applicable to a system with a direct797
link which is capable of clearly distinguishing between the798
detectable and undetectable classes. It has also been shown799
that, for the detectable class, the proposed approach detects800
malicious attacks with high probability. The relay system801
retains the benefits of diversity gain even in the presence802
of an undetectable attack. Further, we extended the proposed803
approach to a more common scenario in which no direct link804
is available.805
APPENDIX A806
PROOF OF PROPOSITION 1807
Without loss of generality, we firstly prove that the decision808
metric DN1 satisfies the two properties of Proposition 1.809
According to Borel’s strong law of large numbers, for any810
arbitrary small positive μ, we have811
lim
N→∞
Pr
⎛
⎜
⎜
⎝
∣
∣
∣
∣
∣
∣
∣
∣
N∑
i=1
I(y[i] < y)I(x[i] = x)
N∑
i=1
I(x[i] = x)
812
− Pr(Y < y|X = x; fV |U ,h)
∣
∣
∣
∣
∣
∣
∣
∣
≤ μ
⎞
⎟
⎟
⎠ = 1. (32)813
By defining a typical set as814
Aμ
(
FY |X(y|x; fV |U ,h)
)
815

{
F
∣
∣
∣
∣
∣F − FY |X(y|x; fV |U ,h)
∣
∣ ≤ μ
}
,816
where FY |X(y|x;Ψ) is the CDF of fY |X(y|x;Ψ), (32) can be817
modified as818
lim
n→∞Pr
{
FY N |XN (y|x) ∈ Aμ
(
FY |X(y|x; fV |U ,h)
)}
= 1.819
(33)820
Under the assumption that (fV |U (v|u),g) ∈ T , we have821
FY |X(y|x; fV |U ,h) = F 0Y |X(y|x;g), where F 0Y |X(y|x;g) is822
the CDF of f0Y |X(y|x;g).823
For any sufficiently small positive δ, we assume that824
∣
∣
∣FY |X(y|x; fV |U ,h)− F 0Y |X(y|x;g)
∣
∣
∣ ≥ δ. (34)825
From (33), it follows that826
∣
∣
∣FY N |XN (y|x)− F 0Y |X(y|x;g)
∣
∣
∣827
∈
∣
∣
∣Aμ{FY |X(y|x; fV |U ,h)− F 0Y |X(y|x;g)}
∣
∣
∣,828
which in turn implies that 829
∣
∣
∣FY N |XN (y|x)− F 0Y |X(y|x;g)
∣
∣
∣ ≥ δ − μ. (35) 830
Let us define ρ1  δ − μ and assume that μ is chosen to be 831
small enough to satisfy ρ1 > 0. From the definition of DN1 832
in (9), (35) leads us to conclude that DN1 > ρ1. 833
Furthermore, according to (33) and (34), for any δ > 0, 834
we have 835
Pr
(
DN1 ≥ ρ1, (fV |U (v|u),g) ∈ T
)
836
= Pr
(
DN1 ≥ ρ1,
∣
∣
∣FY |X(y|x; fV |U ,h)− F 0Y |X(y|x;g)
∣
∣
∣≥δ
)
837
≥ Pr
(
DN1 ≥ ρ1,
∣
∣
∣FY |X(y|x; fV |U ,h)− F 0Y |X(y|x;g)
∣
∣
∣≥δ, 838
FY N |XN (y|x) ∈ Aμ{FY |X(y|x; fV |U ,h)}
)
839
(a)
= Pr
(∣
∣
∣FY |X(y|x; fV |U ,h)− F 0Y |X(y|x;g)
∣
∣
∣ ≥ δ, 840
FY N |XN (y|x) ∈ Aμ{FY |X(y|x; fV |U ,h)}
)
841
≥ Pr
(∣
∣
∣FY |X(y|x; fV |U ,h)− F 0Y |X(y|x;g)
∣
∣
∣ ≥ δ
)
842
− Pr (FY N |XN (y|x) /∈ Aμ{FY |X(y|x; fV |U ,h)}
)
, (36) 843
where (a) is derived by using (33), (34) and (35). From (36), 844
we have 845
Pr
(
DN1 ≥ ρ1
∣
∣(fV |U (v|u),g) ∈ T
)
846
=
Pr
(
DN1 ≥ ρ1, (fV |U (v|u),g) ∈ T
)
Pr
(∣
∣
∣FY |X(y|x; fV |U ,h)− F 0Y |X(y|x;g)
∣
∣
∣ ≥ δ
) 847
(b)
≥ 1− Pr
(
FY N |XN (y|x)Aμ{FY |X(y|x; fV |U ,h)}
)
Pr
(∣
∣
∣FY |X(y|x; fV |U ,h)− F 0Y |X(y|x;g)
∣
∣
∣ ≥ δ
) , 848
(37) 849
where (b) is derived by using (33). 850
As a result, lim
n→∞Pr
(
DN1 > ρ1
∣
∣
∣(fV |U (v|u),g) ∈ T
)
= 1, 851
which proves that DN1 satisfies the first property of Proposi- 852
tion 1. 853
We proceed now to prove that DN1 will satisfy the sec- 854
ond property of Proposition 1. For this, assume that when 855
(fV |U (v|u),g) ∈ T c, we have FY |X(y|x; fV |U ,h) = 856
F 0Y |X(y|x;g). According to (33), it is also true that 857
FY N |XN (y|x) ∈ Aμ{F 0Y |X(y|x;g)}, which implies that 858
∣
∣
∣FY N |XN (y|x)− F 0Y |X(y|x;g)
∣
∣
∣ ∈ |Aμ {0}|, (38) 859
and which yields 860
∣
∣
∣FY N |XN (y|x)− F 0Y |X(y|x;g)
∣
∣
∣ < μ. (39) 861
By defining ρ2  μ, we have DN1 < ρ2, and thus 862
Pr
(
DN1 ≥ ρ2, (fV |U (v|u),g) ∈ T c 863
∣
∣
∣FY N |XN (y|x) ∈ Aμ{FY |X(y|x; fV |U ,h)}
)
= 0. (40) 864
where Pr
(
DN1 ≥ ρ2
∣
∣
∣(fV |U (v|u),g) ∈ T c
)
is easily obtained 865
and has been placed on top of the next page. 866
According to (33), this implies that Pr(FY N |XN 867
(y|x) /∈ Aμ{FY |X(y|x; fV |U ,h)}) → 0. Finally, by means 868
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Pr
(
DN1 ≥ ρ2
∣
∣
∣(fV |U (v|u),g) ∈ T c
)
=
Pr
(
DN1 ≥ ρ2, (fV |U (v|u),g) ∈ T c
∣
∣
∣FY N |XN (y|x) ∈ Aμ{FY |X(y|x; fV |U ,h)}
)
Pr
(
(fV |U (v|u),g) ∈ T c
)
+
Pr
(
FY N |XN (y|x) /∈ Aμ{FY |X(y|x; fV |U ,h)}
)
Pr
(
(fV |U (v|u),g) ∈ T c
) (41)
of (40) and (41), as shown at the top of this page, we have869
lim
N→∞
Pr
(
DN1 ≥ ρ2
∣
∣
∣(fV |U (v|u),g) ∈ T c
)
= 0, which870
proves that DN1 satisfies the second property of Proposition 1.871
By a similar procedure, we can prove that DN2 also satisfies872
the two properties of Proposition 1, which then concludes the873
proof of Proposition 1.874
APPENDIX B875
PROOF OF PROPOSITION 2876
For the convenience of the proof, we introduce the following877
Lemma.878
Lemma 1: Let us consider a set of random variables Ui,879
i = 1, 2, · · · , 5, in which U4 = U2 + U1, U5 = U3 + U1,880
and U1 is independent of both U2 and U3. If there exists a PDF881
such that fU4|X(u4|x) = fU5|X(u5|x), then fU2|X(u2|x) =882
fU3|X(u3|x) must hold.883
Proof: Since U4 = U2 + U1, and U1 and U2 are884
independent of each other, we have885
fU4|X(u4|x) = fU2|X(u2|x) + fU1|X(u1|x). (42)886
From (42), and by taking the characteristic function (CF) of887
U4 conditioned on X = x, we obtain888
ϕU4|X(t|x) = ϕU2|X(t|x)ϕU1|X(t|x), (43)889
where ϕU2|X(t|x) and ϕU1|X(t|x) are, respectively, the CFs of890
U2 and U1 conditioned on X = x.891
Similarly, since U5 = U3 + U1 with U1 and U3 being892
independent with each other, we have893
fU5|X(u5|x) = fU3|X(u3|x) + fU1|X(u1|x). (44)894
Thus, the CF of U5 conditioned on X = x can be expressed895
as896
ϕU5|X(t|x) = ϕU3|X(t|x)ϕU1|X(t|x), (45)897
where ϕU3|X(t|x) is the CF of U3 conditioned on X = x,898
respectively.899
Since fU4|X(u4|x) = fU5|X(u5|x), we have900
ϕU4|X(t|x) = ϕU5|X(t|x). (46)901
Using (43), (45) and (46), we obtain902
ϕU2|X(t|x)ϕU1|X(t|x) = ϕU3|X(t|x)ϕU1|X(t|x), (47)903
and as ϕU1|X(t|x) is non-zero, we have904
ϕU2|X(t|x) = ϕU3|X(t|x). (48)905
Since any PDF can be uniquely determined by its CF, (48) 906
implies that 907
fU2|X(u2|x) = fU3|X(u3|x). (49) 908
909
We now return to the proof of Proposition 2. Since the 910
detectable class T = T1 ∪ T2, we have T c = T c1
⋂
T c2 . For 911
the set T c1 , fY |X(y|x; fV |U ,h) is identical to f0Y |X(y|x;g). 912
Following (1), (2) and (5), we have 913
fhrsV +Nrs|X(t|x; fV |U ,h) = f0grs(gsrX+Nsr)+Nrs|X(t|x;g). 914
(50) 915
According to Lemma 1, it is easy to obtain that 916
fhrsV |X(t|x; fV |U ,h) = f0grs(gsrX+Nsr)|X(t|x;g), 917
(51) 918
and if we note that f0grs(gsrX+Nsr)|X(t|x;g) = 919
1
πσ2srg
2
rs
exp(− ‖t−gsrgrsx‖2σ2srg2rs ), then we have 920
fV |X(t|x; fV |U ,h) = h
2
rs
πσ2srg
2
rs
exp(−‖hrst− gsrgrsx‖
2
σ2srg
2
rs
). 921
(52) 922
Following (2b), (52) can be re-expressed as 923
fY2|X(t|x; fV |U ,h) 924
=
1
π(K2σ2sr + σ2rd)
exp(− ‖t− gsrKx‖
2
(K2σ2sr + σ2rd)
), (53) 925
where K = grshrd
/
hrs is unknown. According to (12), 926
we have 927
f0Y2|X(t|x;g) =
1
πσ22
exp(−‖t− gsrgrdx‖
2
σ22
), (54) 928
where σ22 = g2rdσ2sr + σ2rd. 929
Let us now consider T c2 . For any y1 and y2, we obtain that 930
fY2|Y1(y2|y1; fV |U ,h) = f0Y2|Y1(y2|y1;g). (55) 931
Furthermore, since (Y1, X, Y2) forms a Markov chain as Y1 → 932
X → Y2, we have 933
∑
x∈X
Pr(X = x|Y1 = y1)fY2|X(Y2 = y2|X = x; fV |U ,h) 934
=
∑
x∈X
Pr(X = x|Y1 = y1)f0Y2|X(Y2 = y2|X = x;g). 935
(56) 936
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Note that Pr(X = x|Y1 = y1) in (56) can be written as937
Pr(X = x|Y1 = y1)938
=
Pr(Y1 = y1|X = x) Pr(X = x)
Pr(Y1 = y1)
939
=
Pr(Y1 = y1|X = x) Pr(X = x)∑
x∈X Pr(Y1 = y1|X = x) Pr(X = x)
940
=
1
1 +
∑
X =x exp(y1hsd(x− x)
/
σ2sd)
. (57)941
Without loss of generality, we consider X ∈ (−1,+1).942
If x = +1, it is easy to show that Pr(X = x|Y1 = y1) becomes943
very small when y1 is far less than 0. When y1 → −∞,944
we have lim
y1→−∞
Pr(X = x|Y1 = y1) = 0 and lim
y1→−∞
Pr(X =945
x|Y1 = y1) = 1. Therefore, (56) can be reduced to946
fY2|X(Y2 = y2|X = x; fV |U ,h)947
= f0Y2|X(Y2 = y2|X = x;g). (58)948
Substituting (53) and (54) into (58), we can obtain K = grd,949
which means that fY2|X(y2|x; fV |U ,h) can be expressed only950
by the known unreliable CSI.951
In addition, since the direct link S-D and the relay link952
S-R-D are independent of each other, we have953
fY1,Y2|X(y1, y2|x; fV |U ,h))954
= fY1|X(y1|x)fY2|X(y2|x; fV |U ,h)955
=
1
π(K2σ2sr + σ2rd)σ
2
sd
956
× exp
(
−‖y1 − hsdx‖
2
σ2sd
− ‖y2 − gsrKx‖
2
K2σ2sr + σ2rd
)
957
=
1
π(g2rdσ2sr + σ
2
rd)σ
2
sd
958
× exp
(
−‖y1 − hsdx‖
2
σ2sd
− ‖y2 − gsrgrdx‖
2
g2rdσ
2
sr + σ2rd
)
. (59)959
On the other hand, according to (54), we have960
f0Y1,Y2|X(y1, y2|x;g)961
= fY1|X(y1|x)f0Y2|X(y2|x;g)962
=
1
π(g2rdσ2sr + σ
2
rd)σ
2
sd
963
× exp
(
−‖y1 − hsdx‖
2
σ2sd
− ‖y2 − gsrgrdx‖
2
g2rdσ
2
sr + σ2rd
)
. (60)964
From (59) and (60), we see that fY1,Y2|X(y1, y2|x; fV |U ,h) =965
f0Y1,Y2|X(y1, y2|x;g), which completes the proof of966
Proposition 2.967
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Physical Detection of Misbehavior in Relay Systems
With Unreliable Channel State Information
Tiejun Lv, Senior Member, IEEE, Yajun Yin, Yueming Lu, Shaoshi Yang, Member, IEEE,
Enjie Liu, and Gordon Clapworthy
Abstract— We study the detection of misbehavior in a Gaussian1
relay system, where the source transmits information to the desti-2
nation with the assistance of an amplify-and-forward relay node3
subject to unreliable channel state information (CSI). The relay4
node may be potentially malicious and corrupt the network by5
forwarding garbled information. In this situation, misleading6
feedback may take place, since reliable CSI is unavailable at7
the source and/or the destination. By classifying the action of8
the relay as detectable or undetectable, we propose a novel9
approach that is capable of coping with any malicious attack10
detected and continuing to work effectively in the presence of11
unreliable CSI. We demonstrate that the detectable class of12
attacks can be successfully detected with a high probability.13
Meanwhile, the undetectable class of attacks does not affect the14
performance improvements that are achievable by cooperative15
diversity, even though such an attack may fool the proposed16
detection approach. We also extend the method to deal with the17
case in which there is no direct link between the source and the18
destination. The effectiveness of the proposed approach has been19
validated by numerical results.20
Index Terms— Physical layer security, integrity check,21
unreliable CSI, cooperative relay communications.22
I. INTRODUCTION23
PHYSICAL layer security (PLS) is a promising technology24 that provides secure wireless transmissions by smartly25
exploiting imperfections of the communications medium [1].26
Cooperative relaying is beneficial for improving the coverage27
and transmission reliability of wireless systems [2], where28
single-antenna devices can form a virtual antenna array to29
provide cooperative spatial diversity [3], [4]. However, such30
benefits are attained only when the relays are trustworthy and31
always comply with cooperative protocols. In an adversarial32
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case, some relays might maliciously alter the information sent 33
by the source, thus degrading the performance of the relaying 34
system significantly. The dependence of cooperative systems 35
on the relays represents an inherent vulnerability [5]. There- 36
fore, early detection of misbehavior is essential to maintaining 37
the security of relaying systems and to combating malicious 38
attacks. 39
Traditionally, detection methods are based on cryptography 40
keys or authentication keys, requiring the source and the des- 41
tination to share a secret key [6]–[8]. The key-based detection 42
approach is far from ideal as it imposes a high computational 43
cost and needs a key distribution mechanism. Alternatively, 44
it is possible to detect malicious relays from the physical layer 45
perspective. In particular, Mao and Wu [9] proposed a cross- 46
layer detecting scheme, where pseudo-random tracing symbols 47
were inserted into information bits. To identify the malicious 48
relays, the destination measures the error probability of the 49
observed tracing symbols, according to their a priori ground 50
truth. In [10]–[12], Lo et al. applied a tracing-based method 51
to non-coherent detection in various scenarios, requiring no 52
channel state information (CSI). Note that the transmission 53
of tracing symbols also requires the support from a key- 54
distribution mechanism. Moreover, the performance of tracing- 55
based schemes is highly dependent on the number of tracing 56
symbols used, and an excessive number of them can signifi- 57
cantly reduce the bandwidth efficiency. 58
To avoid the use of external assistance, many detecting 59
schemes exploit ‘clean’ references stemming from the relaying 60
system itself. A ‘clean’ reference contains information that 61
has not been manipulated by the relay for sure. For example, 62
in the orthogonal frequency-division multiplexing (OFDM) 63
based detection scheme of [13], the source regards the trans- 64
mitted information as a reference. Thus, the misbehavior of 65
the relay is detected by examining the correlation between 66
the reference and the information that is forwarded by the 67
relay but overheard at the source. Detection schemes can 68
also be implemented at the destination [14], [15]. The direct 69
link between the source and the destination, as a ‘clean’ 70
reference to the relay link, is used to compare between two 71
different links to determine the relay behavior. However, these 72
schemes [9]–[15] assume that each malicious relay behaves 73
in an independent identically distributed (i.i.d.) manner of a 74
specific form. With respect to arbitrary i.i.d. attacks, Graves 75
and Wong [16] and Cao et al. [17] proposed a novel detection 76
approach in which the relay behavior is modeled as an attack 77
channel to check for any misbehavior. In [16], the source 78
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extracts the estimation of an attack channel based on its own79
transmitted and observed information. This detection method80
has been extended to the scenario in which a direct ‘clean’81
reference is unavailable [17]. However, [17] entirely depends82
on the source distribution. In [18], a detecting and tracing83
scheme for a multi-relay network was studied by partitioning84
the network into several sub-networks as described in [17].85
The detection schemes [9], [13]–[18] above are enabled86
under an ideal assumption that reliable CSI is known in87
advance. However, reliable CSI may not be available in prac-88
tice, especially when relays are malicious. For instance, mali-89
cious relays are reluctant to cooperate initially and, hence, they90
may deliberately manipulate the channel estimation process91
with ease. The whole system is then deceived into a state92
of unreliable CSI. In such cases, the previously mentioned93
schemes [9], [13]–[18] may be severely compromised. Con-94
sidering a point-to-point system, Tugnait [19] proposed a95
scheme to detect the pilot contamination attack, which causes96
unreliable CSI, by superimposing a random sequence on the97
training sequence and using source enumeration methods.98
In this paper, we consider a cooperative relaying system99
with a source-destination pair and a single relay employing100
an amplify and forward (AF) strategy [20]. The potentially101
malicious relay is capable of forwarding false information102
in an arbitrary i.i.d. manner. It can also provide unreliable103
CSI to degrade the system’s performance. Falsified forwarding104
together with the unreliable CSI makes the detection of misbe-105
havior very difficult. Our goal is to detect misbehavior based106
on physical-layer observations. The key difference between107
existing work [16]–[18] and ours is that we take into account108
that the channel estimation process may be compromised and109
hence the available CSI is unreliable. The main contribution110
of this paper is summarized as follows.111
1) We study the misbehavior of the malicious relay under112
the assumption that the misbehavior arises not only from113
falsified forwarding, but also from dishonest feedback.114
According to different combinations of misbehavior115
and from the detection point of the view, we define116
two mutually exclusive attack types – detectable and117
undetectable. We prove that a detectable attack can be118
detected asymptotically by examining the distance mea-119
sure between the distribution of physical-layer obser-120
vations and the distribution of the calculated received121
symbols. The proposed detection scheme needs no extra122
secret keys.123
2) We prove that an undetectable attack does not affect124
the bit error rate (BER) performance that is achiev-125
able by cooperative diversity, even though it cannot126
be identified. This implies that an undetectable attack127
hardly influences the reliability performance of the relay128
network, in the sense that the benefits of diversity gain129
are retained.130
3) For relay systems having direct links, we choose the131
direct link as a ‘clean’ reference. We then extend the132
proposed detection scheme to relay systems having no133
direct link, where the source distribution is known.134
Furthermore, in the absence of prior information of135
the source, we design a ‘clean’ reference by introduc-136
Fig. 1. A cooperative relay system consisting of a source-destination pair
and a potential malicious relay with direct link.
ing artificial noise (AN) to aid the proposed detection 137
scheme. 138
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. The 139
system model and the misbehavior types are described in 140
Section II. In Section III, we elaborate on the proposed 141
detection scheme for detectable attacks and prove that an 142
undetectable attack can achieve the same BER as a detectable 143
attack. The detection scheme is extended to the scenario in 144
which a direct link is absent in Section IV. Section V provides 145
numerical examples and discussions, and conclusions are 146
drawn in Section VI. 147
Notation: Upper and lower case letters denote, respectively, 148
random variables and their realizations. Sans-serif letters 149
denote general elements. | · | represents an absolute value 150
and ‖·‖ represents the Euclidean norm. The transpose of 151
the vector a is aT . For a sequence xN , both x[i] and xi 152
denote the i-th element in xN . X denotes the alphabet of X . 153
I(x[i] = x) is the indicator function denoting whether or not 154
x[i] is x. FXN (x) = 1/N
∑N
i=1 I(x[i] = x) is used to denote 155
the empirical distribution of xN , and implies the relative 156
proportion of occurrence of symbol x in xN . For a sequence 157
yN with consecutive values, the empirical distribution function 158
is trivially defined as FY N (t) = 1/N
∑N
i=1 I(y[i] < t). 159
In a similar fashion, we denote the conditional empirical 160
distribution as 161
FY N |XN (t|x) =
N∑
i=1
I(y[i] < t)I(x[i] = x)
N∑
i=1
I(x[i] = x)
. 162
II. SYSTEM MODEL 163
A. Cooperative Transmission 164
We consider a typical cooperative relay network consisting 165
of a source-destination pair and a potential malicious relay as 166
shown in Fig. 1, where the source (S) tries to send information 167
to the destination (D) with the aid of a relay node (R) and a 168
direct link (S-D link). A relay system without a direct link will 169
be considered in Section IV. Although this three-node relay 170
network model is simple, it is fundamental for studying relay 171
aided cooperative communications. Compared with traditional 172
non-cooperative networks, three-node relay networks can offer 173
several benefits, such as better connectivity, higher throughput 174
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and greater reliability [23]–[25]. The three-node relay network175
model can also be extended to more complicated network176
topology.177
In Fig. 1, the solid and dashed lines represent two trans-178
mission phases, i.e. phases 1 and 2, respectively. The wireless179
channels are assumed to be quasi-static in the same phase.180
1) Phase 1: S first broadcasts an N -length i.i.d. sequence181
XN simultaneously to R and D. Let U and Y1 be the symbols182
received at R and D, respectively. In the symbol-by-symbol183
expression, the time index is omitted. The received symbols184
in Phase 1 can be expressed as185
U = hsrX + Wsr , (1a)186
Y1 = hsdX + Wsd. (1b)187
2) Phase 2: R receives UN, processes it, and then forwards188
V N to D. Here, the symbol V is a processed version of the189
received symbol U . Due to the broadcast nature of wireless190
communication, S can overhear the forwarded information191
V N at the same moment. Let Y denote the received symbol192
overheard by S and Y2 denote the received symbol at D. The193
received symbols in Phase 2 are given by194
Y = hrsV + Wrs, (2a)195
Y2 = hrdV + Wrd, (2b)196
where hij is channel gain between node i and node j with197
i, j ∈ {S,R,D} and i = j. Statistically, we can model them as198
complex Gaussian random variables which capture the effects199
of pass loss and statistical fading in a wireless channel. The200
average transmit energy of the transmitted symbol is denoted201
as Es. Wij represents additive white Gaussian noise (AWGN)202
with variance N0 received at node j.203
CSI needs to be obtained from channel estimation. Before204
the transmission phases, all nodes participate in the channel205
estimation process. Since the malicious relay can manipulate206
the channel estimation process by sending incorrect pilot207
signals, unreliable CSI gij may be provided, which is different208
from the reliable CSI hij . Let g = {gsr, grs, grd} and209
h = {hsr, hrs, hrd} denote the set of the potentially unreliable210
CSI provided and the set of the corresponding reliable CSI,211
respectively. Note that the channel gain of the direct link212
cannot be manipulated by the relay, hence hsd is omitted from213
both of the CSI sets.214
B. Misbehavior Types215
The introduction of the relay opens a door to malicious216
attacks. Instead of complying with the cooperative strategy,217
a malicious relay node may exhibit misbehaviors both in the218
transmission phases and in the channel estimation process.219
Hence, potentially both the information forwarded and the220
CSI provided can be manipulated by the malicious relay.221
We identify the following two types of misbehaviors.222
1) Falsified Forwarding: the relay receives UN in Phase223
1, and then corrupts it into another sequence V N to be224
forwarded in Phase 2. If we assume that the malicious225
relay misbehaves in an arbitrary i.i.d. manner, the for-226
warded sequence V N will obey an arbitrary stochastic227
distribution conditioned on UN . From the perspective of 228
symbol-by-symbol, the relay processing behavior can be 229
characterized by its conditional probability density func- 230
tion (PDF) fV |U (v|u). It is not difficult to derive that if 231
the relay forwards the received symbol U accurately, 232
the conditional PDF is 233
fV |U (v|u) = δ(v − u), (3) 234
where δ(·) is the impulse function. This means that when 235
U = V the relay is amicable with respect to forwarding 236
information. Otherwise, the relay is exhibiting falsified 237
forwarding, also known as a Byzantine attack. 238
2) Dishonest Feedback: In many wireless communication 239
protocols, the transmitter obtains the CSI estimate from 240
the receiver’s feedback. The malicious node is capable 241
of dominating the channel estimation process deliber- 242
ately. In this case the CSI provided may be unreliable. 243
The unreliable CSI provides a malicious node with an 244
opportunity to undermine relay selection, e.g., to select 245
a malicious node as a qualified relay. Further, the des- 246
tination node may combine the information received 247
from the relay and the source inappropriately, due to the 248
unreliable CSI. The CSI provided is said to be reliable 249
if g = h. Otherwise, the relay node is considered to be 250
initiating dishonest feedback that creates unreliable CSI. 251
Note that imperfect CSI is usually caused by channel 252
estimation error, which is an objective measurement 253
error rather than a deliberate attack. Imperfect CSI does 254
not belong to the scope of physical layer security. Thus, 255
imperfect CSI is not considered in this paper. 256
Thus we can employ the parameter pair (fV |U ,g) to describe 257
the behavior of the relay. Maliciousness due to the misbehavior 258
is defined as follows. 259
Definition 1 (Maliciousness of Misbehavior): The relay 260
is considered as cooperative if and only if the pair 261
(fV |U ,g) belongs to the set {fV |U (v|u),g|fV |U (v|u) = 262
δ(v − u),g = h.}; otherwise, the relay is considered as 263
malicious. 264
It is obvious that neither of the above forms of misbehavior 265
is allowed for a cooperative relay. Our goal is to use physical- 266
layer observations to detect maliciousness if and when misbe- 267
havior occurs in the relay system. 268
III. DETECTION APPROACH 269
In this section, we describe the proposed approach for 270
detecting maliciousness in a relay system with a direct link, 271
i.e., falsified forwarding and/or dishonest feedback, but first 272
we introduce the concept of detectability of maliciousness. 273
A. Maliciousness Detectability 274
The source S can observe the symbol Y in Phase 2 (see (2)). 275
The symbol Y goes through a real S-R-S link, which may 276
be manipulated by a malicious relay. For S, the transmitted 277
symbol X offers a ‘clean’ reference. 278
On one hand, we use the conditional likelihood function 279
fY |X(y|x; fV |U ,h) =
∫ +∞
−∞
∫ +∞
−∞
fU|X(u|x;hsr) 280
× fV |U (v|u)fY |V (y|v;hrs) dudv (4) 281
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Fig. 2. Markov chain of S-R-S link and S-R-D link.
to characterize S-R-S link, where the parameters fV |U and h282
are unknown for S.283
On the other hand, S also tries to make use of the CSI284
provided, g, even though it may be unreliable. The conditional285
PDF at S is computed as286
f0Y |X(y|x;g)287
=
∫ +∞
−∞
∫ +∞
−∞
fU|X(u|x; gsr)δ(v − u)fY |V (y|v; grs) dudv288
=
∫ +∞
−∞
fU|X(u|x; gsr)fY |V (y|u; grs) du, (5)289
where the superscript distinguishes the conditional PDF290
f0Y |X(y|x;g) from the conditional likelihood function291
fY |X(y|x; fV |U ,h). Whenever there is no ambiguity, we will292
employ such a notation, i.e. f0Y |X(y|x) and fY |X(y|x), for sim-293
plicity. It is observed that the relay is considered to faithfully294
forward as fV |U (v|u) = δ(v − u) appears in the expression295
for f0Y |X(y|x).296
Since (X,U, V, Y ) forms a Markov chain as X → U →297
V → Y , we have four cases according to different combina-298
tions of the parameter pair (fV |U ,g), as follows:299
1) fV |U = δ(v − u) ∩ g = h; full cooperative relay (no300
misbehavior), we have fY |X(y|x) = f0Y |X(y|x).301
2) fV |U = δ(v−u) ∩ g = h; malicious relay with falsified302
forwarding, we have fY |X(y|x) = f0Y |X(y|x).303
3) fV |U = δ(v−u)∩g = h; malicious relay with dishonest304
feedback, we have fY |X(y|x) = f0Y |X(y|x).305
4) fV |U = δ(v − u) ∩ g = h; malicious relay with306
both misbehaviors. This is difficult to analyse as it is307
hard to determine the equivalence of fY |X(y|x) and308
f0Y |X(y|x).309
As shown in Fig. 2 (a), it is easy to check the relationship310
between fY |X(y|x) and f0Y |X(y|x) in the four different cases.311
The first three are easily determined, but Case 4) is a demand-312
ing problem. From the above, based on the parameter pair313
(fV |U ,g), the inequality of fY |X(y|x) and f0Y |X(y|x) is a314
sufficient condition to determine misbehavior.315
TABLE I
THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN DEFINITION 1 AND DEFINITION 2
This conclusion helps to detect misbehavior in the relaying 316
system considered. We define a set T1 as: 317
T1 :=
{
fV |U , {gsr, grs}
∣
∣
∣fY |X(y|x) = f0Y |X(y|x)
}
. (6) 318
If T1 holds, there must be misbehavior in the S-R-S link; 319
unfortunately we cannot jump to a conclusion of no misbehav- 320
ior if T1 does not hold, owing to Case 4. Thus, T1 is referred 321
to as the detectable set of the parameter pair (fV |U ,g) in the 322
S-R-S link; correspondingly, the complementary set T1c of T1 323
is called the undetectable set of the parameter pair (fV |U ,g) 324
in the S-R-S link. 325
In order to fully check the parameter pair (fV |U ,g), 326
an S-R-D link should be included. For the S-R-D link, the set 327
T2 is defined as 328
T2 :=
{
fV |U , {gsr, grd}
∣
∣
∣fY2|Y1(y2|y1) = f0Y2|Y1(y2|y1)
}
, 329
(7) 330
where fY2|Y1(y2|y1) and f0Y2|Y1(y2|y1) are, respectively, 331
the likelihood function and PDF of the symbol Y2 received 332
at D from the relay link conditioned on the symbol Y1 333
received from the direct link. T2 and its complementary set 334
T c2 are referred to as, respectively, the detectable set and the 335
undetectable set of the parameter pair (fV |U ,g) in the S-R-D 336
link. Fig.2 (b) helps to check the detectable set T2 directly. 337
The parameter pair (fV |U ,g) is completely partitioned by 338
combinations of T1 and T2. We call T = T1
⋃
T2 as the 339
detectable class, in which misbehavior is inevitable. It is 340
emphasized that the complementary set T c = T c1
⋂
T c2 of 341
T implies that the behavior can be cooperative or malicious. 342
Thus, attack types can be given by the following definition. 343
Definition 2 (Attack Types): If the parameter pair 344
(fV |U ,g) belongs to the detectable class T , misbehavior is 345
certain, and this is called a detectable attack; if T c holds 346
and the relay is malicious, the resulting misbehavior is called 347
an undetectable attack. 348
From Definition 2, it is seen that detectable attacks map 349
directly to the detectable class, whereas undetectable attacks 350
map only to a subset of the undetectable class. An undetectable 351
attack demands that falsified forwarding and dishonest feed- 352
back occur simultaneously, but the attack is not detected by a 353
given detection approach. The undetectable attack is a small 354
probability event compared to the detectable attack, because 355
the undetectable attack is required to satisfy stricter conditions. 356
It is emphasized that the undetectable attack is still in an 357
infinite set. Table I illustrates the relationship between Defin- 358
ition 1 and Definition 2, where ∅ denotes the empty set. The 359
action of the relay, i.e., the parameter pair (fV |U ,g), can be 360
fully classified by use of Definitions 1 and 2. A detectable 361
attack results from the overlap of these two definitions, and the 362
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identification of a detectable attack is precisely equivalent to363
the identification of the detectable class T .364
B. Identification of a Detectable Attack365
As the detectable class T involves both T1 and T2, detection366
is implemented at the source node and at the destination367
node. In order to quantify the consecutive received symbols,368
it is convenient to use an n′-length sequence (t1, t2, · · · , tn′)369
satisfying a = t1 < t2 < t3 · · · < tn′ = b, where the370
quantization range [a, b] depends on n′. Further, we con-371
sider the quantization interval Δ = b−an′−1 to be such that372
limn′→∞Δ = 0.373
1) Decision Metric at S: The detection at S focuses on the374
S-R-S link, in which the source uses its transmitted symbols as375
a reference to check whether or not action of the relay node376
is in the detectable set T1. We employ the empirical CDF377
to approximate the likelihood function fY |X(y|x). By jointly378
considering the transmitted and received signal sequences379
(XN , Y N ), the conditional empirical CDF FY N |XN (t|x) at S380
is written as381
FY N |XN (t|x) =
N∑
i=1
I(y[i] < t)I(x[i] = x)
N∑
i=1
I(x[i] = x)
. (8)382
Naturally, a statistical decision metric DN1 is expressed as383
DN1 =
1
n′
n′∑
m=1
∣
∣
∣FY N |XN (tm|x)− F 0Y |X(tm|x)
∣
∣
∣, (9)384
where F 0Y |X(tm|x) is the CDF of f0Y |X(tm|x) as given in (5).385
2) Decision Metric at D: The detection at D is related to386
the security of the S-R-D link and takes place at the same387
time as the detection at S. Since D receives the signal Y N1 in388
Phase 1 (see (1)) and then the signal Y N2 in Phase 2 (see (2)),389
the likelihood function fY2|X(y2|x; fV |U ,h) characterizing the390
S-R-D link can be obtained as391
fY2|X(y2|x; fV |U ,h)392
=
∫ +∞
−∞
∫ +∞
−∞
fU|X(u|x;hsr)fV |U (v|u)fY2|V (y2|v;hrd) dudv.393
(10)394
However, unlike S, D is inaccessible to the transmitted sig-395
nal XN . The received signal Y N1 in the direct link is exploited396
as a ‘clean’ reference for the detection at D. (Y1, X, Y2) forms397
a Markov chain as Y1 → X → Y2, and Y1 and Y2 are condi-398
tionally independent for a given X , so the likelihood function399
conditioned on Y1 ≤ t can be mathematically expressed as400
fY2|Y1(y2|t; fV |U ,h)401
=
∫ t
−∞
∑
x∈X
fY1|X(y1|x)fY2|X(y2|x; fV |U ,h) Pr(X = x) dy1402
/∫ t
−∞
∑
x∈X
fY1|X(y1|x) Pr(X = x) dy1. (11)403
Since the conditional PDF at D f0Y2|X(y2|x;g) is computed as 404
f0Y2|X(y2|x;g) =
∫ +∞
−∞
fU|X(u|x; gsr)fY2|V (y2|v; grd) du, 405
(12) 406
the conditional PDF f0Y2|Y1(y2|t;g) can be formulated as 407
f0Y2|Y1(y2|t;g) 408
=
∫ t
−∞
∑
x∈X
fY1|X(y1|x)f0Y2|X(y2|x;g) Pr(X = x) dy1 409
/∫ t
−∞
∑
x∈X
fY1|X(y1|x) Pr(X = x) dy1. (13) 410
For ease of presentation, fY2|Y1(y2|y1; fV |U ,h) and 411
f0Y2|Y1(y2|y1;g) are written as fY2|Y1(y2|y1) and f0Y2|Y1(y2|y1) 412
in the section below. 413
Based on the pair of received signals (Y N1 , Y N2 ), the empir- 414
ical conditional CDF FY N2 |Y N1 (s|t) can be expressed as 415
FY N2 |Y N1 (s|t) =
N∑
i=1
I(y1[i] < t)I(y2[i] < s)
N∑
i=1
I(y1[i] < t)
. (14) 416
By employing FY N2 |Y N1 (s|t), the statistical decision metric DN2 417
for the detection at D is given by 418
DN2 =
1
n′2
n′∑
p=1
n′∑
q=1
∣
∣
∣FY N2 |Y N1 (tp|tq)− F
0
Y2|Y1(tp|tq)
∣
∣
∣ , (15) 419
where F 0Y2|Y1(tp|tq) is the CDF of f0Y2|Y1(tp|tq) as given 420
in (13). 421
3) Detection: After obtaining the decision statistical metrics 422
DN1 and DN2 , we first identify whether the action of the 423
relay falls into the detectable class T or not. The following 424
proposition will show how DN1 and DN2 identify, respectively, 425
the detectable sets T1 in the S-R-S link and T2 in the S-R-D 426
link. 427
Proposition 1 (Detection at S and D): In the S-R-S link, T1 428
can be detected by DN1 at S; in the S-R-D link, T2 can be 429
detected by DN2 at D. For i = 1, 2, the two decision metrics 430
DN1 and DN2 have the following properties: 431
i) lim
N→∞
Pr
(
DNi > ρ1
∣
∣
∣ (fV |U ,g) ∈ Ti
)
= 1, when 432
Pr
(
(fV |U ,g) ∈ Ti
)
> 0, 433
ii) lim
N→∞
Pr
(
DNi > ρ2
∣
∣
∣ (fV |U ,g) ∈ T ci
)
= 0, when 434
Pr
(
(fV |U ,g) ∈ T ci
)
> 0, where ρ1 and ρ2 are strictly 435
positive, and can be arbitrary small. 436
Proof: See Appendix A. 437
Remark 1: Take the detection at S for example. From (6), 438
the detectable set T1 implies that the likelihood function 439
fY |X(y|x) differs from the conditional PDF f0Y |X(y|x). 440
According to the law of large numbers, the empirical distribu- 441
tion FY N |XN approaches the CDF of fY |X(y|x) as N →∞. 442
From the proof of Proposition 1, we can see that DN1 uses 443
FY N |XN as the bridge to measure the ‘distance’ between 444
fY |X(y|x) and f0Y |X(y|x). 445
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Remark 2: Proposition 1 points out that, if the behavior446
of the relay follows the undetectable set T ci , i = 1, 2, then447
DNi → 0. Otherwise, it is probable that the source is capable448
of identifying a detectable attack. In addition, the missed449
detection and false alarm probabilities of DNi can be arbitrary450
small as N →∞.451
Combining the detection at S with the detection at D,452
the detectable class T can be identified by the proposed453
Algorithm 1 below.454
Algorithm 1 The Identification Procedure for a Detectable
Attack
1: Initialization: Select appropriate N and n′, and receive the
CSI set g.
2: Calculate the decision metrics: S computes DN1 based on
(XN , Y N ), and D computes DN2 based on (Y N1 , Y N2 )
simultaneously.
3: if DN1 → 0 ∩DN2 → 0 then
4: (fV |U ,g) ∈ T c1
⋂
T c2 , the action of the relay belongs to
the undetectable class T c.
5: else
6: (fV |U ,g) ∈ T1
⋃
T2, the action of the relay belongs to
the detectable class T .
7: end if
According to Algorithm 1, if the action of the relay belongs455
to the detectable class, we draw a conclusion immediately that456
the relay is suffering from a malicious attack; if the action of457
the relay belongs to the undetectable class, we cannot decide458
whether the relay is suffering from a malicious attack or not.459
C. Signal Detection of the Undetectable Class460
According to Definitions 1 and 2, we know that unde-461
tectable class consists of undetectable attacks and cooperative462
(or friendly) relays. In other words, if falsified forwarding and463
dishonest feedback occur simultaneously, it is possible that464
an undetectable attack has the same statistical behavior as a465
cooperative relay. Thus, we cannot identify whether a mali-466
cious attack is occurring by use of Algorithm 1; consequently,467
a malicious relay that is performing an undetectable attack468
can disguise itself as a cooperative one – from the signal469
processing point of view, the performance of an undetectable470
attack is the same as that of the cooperative relay. On the471
assumption of an i.i.d. attack, the undetectable attack can be472
neglected.473
At D, maximum-likelihood (ML) demodulation is used,474
based on the CSI g. Following (1) and (13), the sym-475
bols received from the direct link and the relay link are476
re-expressed as477
{
Y1 = hsdX + Wsd,
Y2 = gsrgrdX + grdWsr + Wrd,
478
which are written in vector form as Y = HX + W,479
with Y =
[
Y1, Y2
]T
, H =
[
hsd, gsrgrd
]T
and W =480
[
Wsd, grdWsr + Wrd
]T
.481
Fig. 3. A cooperative relay system consisting of a source-destination pair
and a potential malicious relay without direct link.
ML detection is then performed as 482
Xˆ = argmax
X∈X
Pr(Y|X) = argmin
X∈X
‖Y −HX‖2. (16) 483
From (16), the joint PDF of Y, fY1,Y2|X(y1, y2|x; fV |U ,h), 484
only effects ML detection. Then the following proposition 485
gives a property of the undetectable class T c. 486
Proposition 2: If the parameter pair (fV |U ,g) 487
belongs to the undetectable class T c, then there exists 488
fY1,Y2|X(y1, y2|x; fV |U ,h) = f0Y1,Y2|X(y1, y2|x;g) regardless 489
of whether there is an undetectable attack or cooperative 490
behavior. 491
Proof: See Appendix B. 492
Remark 3: Essentially Proposition 2 identifies that, if the 493
action of the relay belongs to the undetectable class T c, 494
the distributions of the received symbols from the direct 495
link and the relay link are subject to the same joint PDF 496
f0Y1,Y2|X(y1, y2|x;g). Therefore, ML detection has the same 497
outcome irrespective of whether it arises from an undetectable 498
attack or from cooperative behavior. 499
In terms of the signal detection performance, an unde- 500
tectable attack is no worse than cooperative behavior. This 501
implies that, for the undetectable attack, the symbols received 502
can be properly demodulated as if they resulted from coop- 503
erative behavior. That is, although the undetectable attack 504
cannot be identified by Algorithm 1, a relay system with an 505
undetectable attack can still deliver the same diversity order 506
performance as a relay system with cooperative behavior. The 507
symbol error rate (SER) for the undetectable attack in the high 508
signal-to-noise ratio (SNR) region is approximated as [21] 509
Pr(e)
high-SNR	 3
Kγ2
, (17) 510
where K = |gsr|(|gsd|+|grd|)|gsd||grd| , and γ = Es/N0 is SNR 511
without fading. It is observed that the diversity order of the 512
undetectable attack is 2. 513
An undetectable attack involves the collusion between fal- 514
sified forwarding and the dishonest feedback. This escapes 515
detection because the damage caused by the falsified forward- 516
ing is mitigated by the dishonest feedback. This intuitively 517
explains why, for an undetectable attack, the malicious relay 518
can still be used to maintain the cooperative diversity. 519
IV. RELAY SYSTEM WITHOUT A DIRECT LINK 520
In this section we extend our consideration from relay 521
systems with a direct link to those without a direct link 522
between the S and the D due to coverage, as shown in Fig. 3. 523
While the detection at S is unaffected as the S-R-S link 524
is still present, in the absence of a direct link as a ‘clean’ 525
reference, the approach proposed in Section III-B cannot be 526
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applied immediately. We must develop a new detection method527
at D that can be used for relay systems without a direct link.528
We first repeat the two-phase transmission. Here, the nota-529
tion is consistent with earlier sections.530
In Phase 1, S sends XN to R (solid line in Fig. 3).531
The symbol received at R, U , is written as532
U = hsrX + Wsr. (18)533
R processes the UN received using AF protocol, generates534
V N and then forwards it in Phase 2 (dashed line in Fig. 3).535
The symbol received at D is expressed as536
Y2 = hrdV + Wrd, (19)537
where for i, j ∈ {S,R,D}, i = j, hij is the channel gain538
between node i and node j, and Wij is the Gaussian noise539
at node j with variance N0. Definition 1 still applies to this540
relay system, while Definition 2 is changed according to the541
following cases.542
A. Known Source Distribution543
If the source distribution is known, we can use a simple544
extension of the previous detection approach based on a direct545
link. The reliable CSI set is denoted as h = {hsr, hrs, hrd}546
and the CSI set provided is denoted as g = {gsr, grs, grd}.547
Since the S-R-S link remains unchanged, T1 can still be548
checked by the detection at S. However, the detection at D549
will be modified based on the known source distribution.550
The likelihood function is given by551
fY2(y2; fV |U ,h) =
∑
x∈X
fY2|X(y2|x; fV |U ,h) Pr(X), (20)552
where fY2|X(y2|x; fV |U ,h) is given in (10), and the condi-553
tional PDF is expressed as554
f0Y2(y;g) =
∑
x∈X f
0
Y2|X(y|x;g) Pr(X), (21)555
where f0Y2|X(y|x;g) is given in (12).556
According to (20) and (21), T2 is redefined as557
T2 :=
{
fV |U , {gsr, grd}
∣
∣fY2(y2; fV |U ,h) = f0Y2(y2;g)
}
.558
By observing the received sequence Y N , the empirical CDF559
at D is given by560
FY N2 (t) =
1
N
N∑
i=1
I(y2[i] < t). (22)561
From (20), (21) and (22), the decision metric DN2 in (15) is562
modified to563
DN2 =
1
n′2
∑n′
m=1
∣
∣
∣FY N2 (tm)− F 0Y2(tm)
∣
∣
∣, (23)564
where F 0Y2(t) is the CDF of f
0
Y2
(t;g) given in (21).565
By employing this new DN2 , together with (9), Algorithm 1566
can deal with the detection of misbehavior for relay systems567
without direct links, based on a known source distribution.568
Fig. 4. A cooperative relay system with added artificial noise, where the
solid and dashed lines denote Phase 1 and Phase 2, respectively.
B. Unknown Source Distribution 569
If the source distribution is unknown to the relay system, 570
the destination has no access to any ‘clean’ reference, since 571
all physical layer observations tend to be manipulated. Adding 572
auxiliary information can help to detect pilot contamination 573
attack [19]. We employ additive AN to assist in building 574
trustworthy reference information. 575
Traditionally, AN is designed to lie in the null space of 576
the main channel [22], and it is exploited to degrade an 577
eavesdropper’s channel so that a secure capacity is guaranteed. 578
In this paper, instead of using the traditional design of AN, 579
we propose a different type of AN, as described below. 580
1) The structure of AN requires that the source is equipped 581
with multiple antennas. Single-antenna nodes can emu- 582
late a distributed multi-antenna array. By executing a 583
two-way communication protocol (see Fig. 4), the source 584
and the destination simultaneously send information to 585
the relay, thus the condition of forming AN can be 586
satisfied. 587
2) The AN is defined as the product of coefficient matrix 588
C and key vector k. Then, the AN is denoted as Ck, 589
where C = diag{c1, c2} and k = [k1, k2]T . 590
3) According to the two-way communication protocol, 591
the AN lies in the null space of the provided CSI vector 592
gr = [gsr, gdr]T so that gTr Ck = 0. 593
4) For a given C, when gr is known and ‖k‖ = 1, the AN 594
is deterministic rather than random. 595
5) The AN changes with time, which takes place when the 596
coefficient matrix C changes. 597
6) Conventionally, the wiretap channel is assumed to be 598
uncorrelated with the main channel, which implies 599
hTr Ck = 0. This assumption is invalid in the case 600
considered, because gr represents unreliable CSI that 601
can be of any value. For example, the dishonest feedback 602
can allow gr to be correlated with hr, say, gr = αhr 603
for α = 1. Then, we have hTr Ck = 0 and AN will fail. 604
Therefore, our analysis of the dishonest feedback covers 605
two separate cases: gr is either correlated or uncorre- 606
lated with hr. 607
In Phase 1, both S and D send AN Ck simultaneously. 608
The signal received at R is expressed as 609
U = hTr Ck + Wr, (24) 610
where hr = [hsr, hdr]T . Wr is Gaussian noise at R with 611
variance N0. 612
In Phase 2, R receives UN and then forwards a processed 613
version, V N , to S and D due to the broadcast nature of a 614
wireless channel. The signals received at S and at D are 615
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written as616
Y1 = hrsV + Wrs, (25a)617
Y2 = hrdV + Wrd, (25b)618
where hrs and hrd are channel gains, and Wrs and Wrd are619
Gaussian noise with variance N0 at S and at R, respectively.620
In the channel estimation process, R can know the CSI of621
both the S-R link and the D-R link, as S and D send pilot622
signals to R. Then, due to dishonest feedback, R broadcasts the623
potentially unreliable CSI, instead of the valid one, to S and D.624
When the unreliable CSI is obtained at S and D, the proposed625
AN-aided scheme comes into play.626
Because of the symmetry of the system considered, we show627
the detection results from a source perspective, and the con-628
ditional likelihood function is given by629
fY1(y1; fV |U ,h)630
=
∫ +∞
−∞
∫ +∞
−∞
fU (u;hsr)fV |U (v|u)fY1|V (y1|v;hrs) dudv,631
(26)632
where h = [hsr, hdr, hrs, hrd] is the reliable CSI set. The633
conditional PDF is formulated as634
f0Y1(y1;g)635
=
∫ +∞
−∞
∫ +∞
−∞
fU (u; gsr)δ(v − u)fY1|V (y1|v; grs) dudv636
=
∫ +∞
−∞
fU (u; gsr)fY1|V (y1|u; grs) du, (27)637
where g = [gsr, gdr, grs, grd] is the CSI set provided, with638
fY2(y2; fV |U ,h) and f0Y2(y2;g) being expressed in the similar639
way.640
We discuss the four cases of the parameter pair (fV |U ,g)641
as follows.642
1) fV |U = δ(v − u) ∩ g = h. It is easy to obtain643
fY1(y1; fV |U ,h) = f0Y1(y1;g).644
2) fV |U = δ(v − u) ∩ g = h. First, we have645
fU (u;hsr) = fU (u; gsr) since AN is nulled out; then646
we have fY1(y1; fV |U ,h) = f0Y1(y1;g) because fV |U =647
δ(v − u) and fY1|V (y1|v;hrs) = fY1|V (y1|v; grs).648
3) • fV |U = δ(v − u) ∩ g = h ∩ gr = αhr,649
for α = 1.650
According to (26) and (27), we have651
fY1(y1; fV |U ,h) = f0Y1(y1;g) as hTr Ck = 0.652
• fV |U = δ(v − u) ∩ g = h ∩ gr = αhr,653
for α = 1.654
It is observed that Ck lies in the null space of hr,655
so hTr Ck = 0; if g = h but grs = hrs, we have656
fY1(y1; fV |U ,h) = f0Y1(y1;g).657
4) • fV |U = δ(v − u) ∩ g = h ∩ gr = αhr,658
for α = 1.659
The two types of misbehavior have the potential660
to make fY1(y1; fV |U ,h) = f0Y1(y1;g). By arti-661
ficially operating C, hTr Ck changes over time662
and cannot be bounded by i.i.d. attack manner –663
fY1(y1; fV |U ,h) = f0Y1(y1;g) may hold for some664
Cs with the specific pair (fV |U ,g), but it does not665
hold when C changes. In general, we must have 666
fY1(y1; fV |U ,h) = f0Y1(y1;g) by using a time- 667
varying coefficient matrix C. 668
• fV |U = δ(v − u) ∩ g = h ∩ gr = αhr, 669
for α = 1. 670
The matrix C fails to change hTr Ck as Ck lies 671
in the null space of hr. It is possible to obtain 672
fY1(y1; fV |U ,h) = f
0
Y1
(y1;g) with the specific pair 673
(fV |U ,g), which we will discuss later. 674
From the above discussion, if gr = αhr for α = 1, 675
a sufficient condition to determine misbehavior of the relay 676
is that (fV |U ,g) makes fY1(y1; fV |U ,h) = f0Y1(y1;g). When 677
gr = αhr for α = 1, it is still possible that fY1(y1; fV |U ,h) = 678
f0Y1(y1;g), because AN Ck fails to enable the distribution Y1 679
to distinguish fY1(y1; fV |U ,h) from f0Y1(y1;g). To address 680
this, we modify the AN Ck to C˜k˜, where gTr C˜k˜ = 0. There- 681
fore, for the second case of 3), the introduction of C˜k˜ means 682
that fY1(y1; fV |U ,h) = f0Y1(y1;g). However, for the sec- 683
ond case of 4), it is still possible that fY1(y1; fV |U ,h) = 684
f0Y1(y1;g). 685
As previously, we define 686
TAN1 :=
{
fV |U ,g
∣
∣fY1(y1; fV |U ,h) = f0Y1(y1;g)
}
, 687
and 688
TAN2 :=
{
fV |U ,g
∣
∣fY2(y2; fV |U ,h) = f0Y2(y2;g)
}
. 689
TAN = TAN1
⋃
TAN2 is referred to as the detectable class, 690
and its complement, T cAN , as the undetectable class. 691
1) To identify the detectable class TAN , we need detection 692
at both S and D. For j = 1, 2, based on the received 693
sequences Y N1 and Y N2 , the empirical CDFs at S and at 694
D are given by 695
FY Nj (t) =
1
N
N∑
i=1
I(y2[i] < t). (28) 696
Similarly, for j = 1, 2, the decision metric DNj is 697
written as 698
DNj =
1
n′2
n′∑
m=1
∣
∣
∣FY Nj (tm)− F
0
Yj (tm)
∣
∣
∣, (29) 699
where F 0Yj (t) is the CDF of f
0
Yj
(t;g). The identifica- 700
tion procedure of the detectable attack is elaborated in 701
Algorithm 2. 702
2) We now focus on the undetectable class T cAN . From the 703
expression of f0Y2(y2;g), Y2 is formulated as 704
Y2 = grd(Wr + MgTr C˜k˜) + Wrd, (30) 705
where M is the number of occurrences of C˜k˜ in an 706
N -length block (usually taken to be N/3). Specifically, 707
by setting C˜ = diag{1/αM, 0} and k˜ = [X, 0]T when 708
gr = αhr, (30) is rewritten as 709
Y2 = grd(Wr + hsrX) + Wrd, (31) 710
According to the definition of TAN2, we have 711
fY2(y2; fV |U ,h) = f0Y2(y2;g). Following the same logic 712
as in Section III-C, the signal detection performance 713
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Fig. 5. The empirical CDFs of DN1 and DN2 for the four detectable attacks considered.
Algorithm 2 The Identification Procedure for Attack
Detection With Aided AN
1: Initialization: generate coefficient matrices C1, C2 and C˜
and give the CSI set g.
2: Calculate AN: compute k1, k2, and k˜ based on C1, C2,
and C˜, respectively.
3: Add AN: take turns adding C1k1, C2k2 and C˜k˜ at S and
D in each instant.
4: Calculate decision metric: DN1 and DN2 are computed at S
and at D, respectively.
5: if DN1 → 0 ∩DN2 → 0 then
6: The relay action is a member of the undetectable class
T cAN .
7: else
8: The relay action belongs to the detectable class TAN –
the relay must be misbehaving.
9: end if
of the undetectable attack is the same as that of the714
cooperative scenario.715
V. NUMERICAL EXAMPLES716
A. Relay Systems With a Direct Link717
As illustration, we present here both detectable and unde-718
tectable attacks; we also evaluate the effectiveness of the719
proposed approach in identifying the two types of attack.720
1) Detectable Attack: We consider a the relay system shown721
in Fig. 1, with S transmitting a BPSK signal with unit energy.722
Assume that the reliable CSI set h = [1, 1, 1], the AWGN vari-723
ance N0 = 0.01, and the direct link channel gain hsd = 0.8.724
The block length was selected to have N = 1000, and for725
quantization purposes n′ = 100, −a = b = √n′/2, which726
implies that Δ = 1/
√
n′.727
To verify the effectiveness of the proposed detection728
schemes, the following four detectable malicious attacks were729
considered:730
• CASE 1 - Dishonest Feedback: The relay provides an 731
unreliable CSI with g = [0.6, 0.8, 0.7]. 732
• CASE 2 - Falsified Forwarding I: The relay actively 733
injects Gaussian noise distributed with N (0, 0.04). 734
• CASE 3 - Falsified Forwarding II: The relay intention- 735
ally adds noise with uniform distribution U(−1,+1). 736
• CASE 4 - Mixed Attack: Both dishonest feedback and 737
falsified forwarding are considered in this case; the relay 738
injects Gaussian noise distributed with N (0, 0.0025) and 739
provides g = [0.9, 0.9, 1]. 740
Fig. 5 shows the empirical CDFs of DN1 and DN2 after 741
800 computer simulation runs for each of the above cases. It 742
can be observed that there is a clear separation between the 743
undetectable class and the detectable class; this can be used 744
as a threshold (e.g. δ = 0.005 for the detection at S) for 745
identifying the detectable class. These results further verify 746
the effectiveness of Proposition 1. 747
2) Undetectable Attack: We assume that the reliable CSI 748
h = [1,
√
2/2,
√
2/2] and the CSI provided g = [
√
2/2, 1, 1], 749
and that the malicious relay performs falsified forwarding by 750
injecting Gaussian noise distributed with N (0, 0.01). Fig. 6 751
shows the empirical CDFs of DN1 and DN2 for cooperative 752
behavior and an undetectable attack. It is evident that the 753
cooperative behavior and the undetectable attack are not 754
distinguishable. 755
3) BER Performance in the Presence of an Undetectable 756
Attack: We assume that the channel gain of the direct link 757
hsd = 0.4 and the injected noise power (falsified forwarding) 758
is set at the same level as N0. Fig. 7 illustrates the BER 759
performance versus SNR for different noise powers; the unde- 760
tectable attack is seen to have the same BER performance 761
as both cooperative behaviour and direct transmission from S 762
to D. These results verify the previous claim that, even for 763
undetectable attacks, the diversity gain is maintained. 764
B. Systems Without a Direct Link 765
1) Detectable Attack: The source transmits BPSK signals 766
and the reliable CSI is set as h = [1/2, 1/3, 1/2, 1/2]. 767
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Fig. 6. The empirical CDFs of DN1 and DN2 for the undetectable attack considered.
Fig. 7. BER performance comparisons among cooperative behavior, the unde-
tectable class, and direct transmission.
The coefficient matrices are C1 =
[−1 0
0 2
]
, C2 =
[
2 0
0 −1
]
768
and C˜ =
[
1 0
0 0
]
. Correspondingly, k1 = [2/
√
5, 1/
√
5]T ,769
k2 = [1/
√
5, 2/
√
5]T and k˜ = [1, 0]T . N0 = 1/
√
5. The770
block length is chosen to have N = 1000 and, for quantization771
purposes, n′ = 100, −a = b = √n′/2, which implies that772
Δ = 1/
√
n′. The three different cases are discussed below.773
• CASE 1 - Dishonest Feedback: The relay provides the774
unreliable CSI g = [1/2, 1/2, 1/3, 1/3].775
• CASE 2 - Malicious Forwarding I: The relay actively776
injects Gaussian noise distributed with N (0, 1/√5).777
• CASE 3 - Mixed Attack: We consider both dishonest778
feedback and falsified forwarding, where the relay injects779
Gaussian noise distributed with N (0, 1/√5) and provides780
g = [1/3, 1/3, 1/2, 1/2].781
Fig. 8 shows the empirical CDFs of Dn1 after 800 computer782
simulation runs, in each of the three cases. The proposed783
decision metric is clearly capable of distinguishing between784
the detectable and undetectable classes.785
Fig. 8. The empirical CDFs of DN1 for the three detectable attacks
considered.
Fig. 9. The empirical CDFs of DN1 for the undetectable attack considered.
2) Undetectable Attacks: We consider the previously 786
described simulation model with a different g = [1/4, 1/6, 787
1/4, 1/4], and gr = αhr for α = 1/2. The malicious 788
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relay conducts falsified forwarding by injecting Gaussian noise789
distributed with N (0, 1/√5). Fig. 9 demonstrates that it is790
impossible to differentiate between cooperative behavior and791
an undetectable attack.792
VI. CONCLUSION793
This paper has investigated the problem of detecting mali-794
cious attacks in a two-hop AF relay network in the pres-795
ence of an unreliable CSI. In particular, we have proposed796
a detection approach applicable to a system with a direct797
link which is capable of clearly distinguishing between the798
detectable and undetectable classes. It has also been shown799
that, for the detectable class, the proposed approach detects800
malicious attacks with high probability. The relay system801
retains the benefits of diversity gain even in the presence802
of an undetectable attack. Further, we extended the proposed803
approach to a more common scenario in which no direct link804
is available.805
APPENDIX A806
PROOF OF PROPOSITION 1807
Without loss of generality, we firstly prove that the decision808
metric DN1 satisfies the two properties of Proposition 1.809
According to Borel’s strong law of large numbers, for any810
arbitrary small positive μ, we have811
lim
N→∞
Pr
⎛
⎜
⎜
⎝
∣
∣
∣
∣
∣
∣
∣
∣
N∑
i=1
I(y[i] < y)I(x[i] = x)
N∑
i=1
I(x[i] = x)
812
− Pr(Y < y|X = x; fV |U ,h)
∣
∣
∣
∣
∣
∣
∣
∣
≤ μ
⎞
⎟
⎟
⎠ = 1. (32)813
By defining a typical set as814
Aμ
(
FY |X(y|x; fV |U ,h)
)
815

{
F
∣
∣
∣
∣
∣F − FY |X(y|x; fV |U ,h)
∣
∣ ≤ μ
}
,816
where FY |X(y|x;Ψ) is the CDF of fY |X(y|x;Ψ), (32) can be817
modified as818
lim
n→∞Pr
{
FY N |XN (y|x) ∈ Aμ
(
FY |X(y|x; fV |U ,h)
)}
= 1.819
(33)820
Under the assumption that (fV |U (v|u),g) ∈ T , we have821
FY |X(y|x; fV |U ,h) = F 0Y |X(y|x;g), where F 0Y |X(y|x;g) is822
the CDF of f0Y |X(y|x;g).823
For any sufficiently small positive δ, we assume that824
∣
∣
∣FY |X(y|x; fV |U ,h)− F 0Y |X(y|x;g)
∣
∣
∣ ≥ δ. (34)825
From (33), it follows that826
∣
∣
∣FY N |XN (y|x)− F 0Y |X(y|x;g)
∣
∣
∣827
∈
∣
∣
∣Aμ{FY |X(y|x; fV |U ,h)− F 0Y |X(y|x;g)}
∣
∣
∣,828
which in turn implies that 829
∣
∣
∣FY N |XN (y|x)− F 0Y |X(y|x;g)
∣
∣
∣ ≥ δ − μ. (35) 830
Let us define ρ1  δ − μ and assume that μ is chosen to be 831
small enough to satisfy ρ1 > 0. From the definition of DN1 832
in (9), (35) leads us to conclude that DN1 > ρ1. 833
Furthermore, according to (33) and (34), for any δ > 0, 834
we have 835
Pr
(
DN1 ≥ ρ1, (fV |U (v|u),g) ∈ T
)
836
= Pr
(
DN1 ≥ ρ1,
∣
∣
∣FY |X(y|x; fV |U ,h)− F 0Y |X(y|x;g)
∣
∣
∣≥δ
)
837
≥ Pr
(
DN1 ≥ ρ1,
∣
∣
∣FY |X(y|x; fV |U ,h)− F 0Y |X(y|x;g)
∣
∣
∣≥δ, 838
FY N |XN (y|x) ∈ Aμ{FY |X(y|x; fV |U ,h)}
)
839
(a)
= Pr
(∣
∣
∣FY |X(y|x; fV |U ,h)− F 0Y |X(y|x;g)
∣
∣
∣ ≥ δ, 840
FY N |XN (y|x) ∈ Aμ{FY |X(y|x; fV |U ,h)}
)
841
≥ Pr
(∣
∣
∣FY |X(y|x; fV |U ,h)− F 0Y |X(y|x;g)
∣
∣
∣ ≥ δ
)
842
− Pr (FY N |XN (y|x) /∈ Aμ{FY |X(y|x; fV |U ,h)}
)
, (36) 843
where (a) is derived by using (33), (34) and (35). From (36), 844
we have 845
Pr
(
DN1 ≥ ρ1
∣
∣(fV |U (v|u),g) ∈ T
)
846
=
Pr
(
DN1 ≥ ρ1, (fV |U (v|u),g) ∈ T
)
Pr
(∣
∣
∣FY |X(y|x; fV |U ,h)− F 0Y |X(y|x;g)
∣
∣
∣ ≥ δ
) 847
(b)
≥ 1− Pr
(
FY N |XN (y|x)Aμ{FY |X(y|x; fV |U ,h)}
)
Pr
(∣
∣
∣FY |X(y|x; fV |U ,h)− F 0Y |X(y|x;g)
∣
∣
∣ ≥ δ
) , 848
(37) 849
where (b) is derived by using (33). 850
As a result, lim
n→∞Pr
(
DN1 > ρ1
∣
∣
∣(fV |U (v|u),g) ∈ T
)
= 1, 851
which proves that DN1 satisfies the first property of Proposi- 852
tion 1. 853
We proceed now to prove that DN1 will satisfy the sec- 854
ond property of Proposition 1. For this, assume that when 855
(fV |U (v|u),g) ∈ T c, we have FY |X(y|x; fV |U ,h) = 856
F 0Y |X(y|x;g). According to (33), it is also true that 857
FY N |XN (y|x) ∈ Aμ{F 0Y |X(y|x;g)}, which implies that 858
∣
∣
∣FY N |XN (y|x)− F 0Y |X(y|x;g)
∣
∣
∣ ∈ |Aμ {0}|, (38) 859
and which yields 860
∣
∣
∣FY N |XN (y|x)− F 0Y |X(y|x;g)
∣
∣
∣ < μ. (39) 861
By defining ρ2  μ, we have DN1 < ρ2, and thus 862
Pr
(
DN1 ≥ ρ2, (fV |U (v|u),g) ∈ T c 863
∣
∣
∣FY N |XN (y|x) ∈ Aμ{FY |X(y|x; fV |U ,h)}
)
= 0. (40) 864
where Pr
(
DN1 ≥ ρ2
∣
∣
∣(fV |U (v|u),g) ∈ T c
)
is easily obtained 865
and has been placed on top of the next page. 866
According to (33), this implies that Pr(FY N |XN 867
(y|x) /∈ Aμ{FY |X(y|x; fV |U ,h)}) → 0. Finally, by means 868
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Pr
(
DN1 ≥ ρ2
∣
∣
∣(fV |U (v|u),g) ∈ T c
)
=
Pr
(
DN1 ≥ ρ2, (fV |U (v|u),g) ∈ T c
∣
∣
∣FY N |XN (y|x) ∈ Aμ{FY |X(y|x; fV |U ,h)}
)
Pr
(
(fV |U (v|u),g) ∈ T c
)
+
Pr
(
FY N |XN (y|x) /∈ Aμ{FY |X(y|x; fV |U ,h)}
)
Pr
(
(fV |U (v|u),g) ∈ T c
) (41)
of (40) and (41), as shown at the top of this page, we have869
lim
N→∞
Pr
(
DN1 ≥ ρ2
∣
∣
∣(fV |U (v|u),g) ∈ T c
)
= 0, which870
proves that DN1 satisfies the second property of Proposition 1.871
By a similar procedure, we can prove that DN2 also satisfies872
the two properties of Proposition 1, which then concludes the873
proof of Proposition 1.874
APPENDIX B875
PROOF OF PROPOSITION 2876
For the convenience of the proof, we introduce the following877
Lemma.878
Lemma 1: Let us consider a set of random variables Ui,879
i = 1, 2, · · · , 5, in which U4 = U2 + U1, U5 = U3 + U1,880
and U1 is independent of both U2 and U3. If there exists a PDF881
such that fU4|X(u4|x) = fU5|X(u5|x), then fU2|X(u2|x) =882
fU3|X(u3|x) must hold.883
Proof: Since U4 = U2 + U1, and U1 and U2 are884
independent of each other, we have885
fU4|X(u4|x) = fU2|X(u2|x) + fU1|X(u1|x). (42)886
From (42), and by taking the characteristic function (CF) of887
U4 conditioned on X = x, we obtain888
ϕU4|X(t|x) = ϕU2|X(t|x)ϕU1|X(t|x), (43)889
where ϕU2|X(t|x) and ϕU1|X(t|x) are, respectively, the CFs of890
U2 and U1 conditioned on X = x.891
Similarly, since U5 = U3 + U1 with U1 and U3 being892
independent with each other, we have893
fU5|X(u5|x) = fU3|X(u3|x) + fU1|X(u1|x). (44)894
Thus, the CF of U5 conditioned on X = x can be expressed895
as896
ϕU5|X(t|x) = ϕU3|X(t|x)ϕU1|X(t|x), (45)897
where ϕU3|X(t|x) is the CF of U3 conditioned on X = x,898
respectively.899
Since fU4|X(u4|x) = fU5|X(u5|x), we have900
ϕU4|X(t|x) = ϕU5|X(t|x). (46)901
Using (43), (45) and (46), we obtain902
ϕU2|X(t|x)ϕU1|X(t|x) = ϕU3|X(t|x)ϕU1|X(t|x), (47)903
and as ϕU1|X(t|x) is non-zero, we have904
ϕU2|X(t|x) = ϕU3|X(t|x). (48)905
Since any PDF can be uniquely determined by its CF, (48) 906
implies that 907
fU2|X(u2|x) = fU3|X(u3|x). (49) 908
909
We now return to the proof of Proposition 2. Since the 910
detectable class T = T1 ∪ T2, we have T c = T c1
⋂
T c2 . For 911
the set T c1 , fY |X(y|x; fV |U ,h) is identical to f0Y |X(y|x;g). 912
Following (1), (2) and (5), we have 913
fhrsV +Nrs|X(t|x; fV |U ,h) = f0grs(gsrX+Nsr)+Nrs|X(t|x;g). 914
(50) 915
According to Lemma 1, it is easy to obtain that 916
fhrsV |X(t|x; fV |U ,h) = f0grs(gsrX+Nsr)|X(t|x;g), 917
(51) 918
and if we note that f0grs(gsrX+Nsr)|X(t|x;g) = 919
1
πσ2srg
2
rs
exp(− ‖t−gsrgrsx‖2σ2srg2rs ), then we have 920
fV |X(t|x; fV |U ,h) = h
2
rs
πσ2srg
2
rs
exp(−‖hrst− gsrgrsx‖
2
σ2srg
2
rs
). 921
(52) 922
Following (2b), (52) can be re-expressed as 923
fY2|X(t|x; fV |U ,h) 924
=
1
π(K2σ2sr + σ2rd)
exp(− ‖t− gsrKx‖
2
(K2σ2sr + σ2rd)
), (53) 925
where K = grshrd
/
hrs is unknown. According to (12), 926
we have 927
f0Y2|X(t|x;g) =
1
πσ22
exp(−‖t− gsrgrdx‖
2
σ22
), (54) 928
where σ22 = g2rdσ2sr + σ2rd. 929
Let us now consider T c2 . For any y1 and y2, we obtain that 930
fY2|Y1(y2|y1; fV |U ,h) = f0Y2|Y1(y2|y1;g). (55) 931
Furthermore, since (Y1, X, Y2) forms a Markov chain as Y1 → 932
X → Y2, we have 933
∑
x∈X
Pr(X = x|Y1 = y1)fY2|X(Y2 = y2|X = x; fV |U ,h) 934
=
∑
x∈X
Pr(X = x|Y1 = y1)f0Y2|X(Y2 = y2|X = x;g). 935
(56) 936
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Note that Pr(X = x|Y1 = y1) in (56) can be written as937
Pr(X = x|Y1 = y1)938
=
Pr(Y1 = y1|X = x) Pr(X = x)
Pr(Y1 = y1)
939
=
Pr(Y1 = y1|X = x) Pr(X = x)∑
x∈X Pr(Y1 = y1|X = x) Pr(X = x)
940
=
1
1 +
∑
X =x exp(y1hsd(x− x)
/
σ2sd)
. (57)941
Without loss of generality, we consider X ∈ (−1,+1).942
If x = +1, it is easy to show that Pr(X = x|Y1 = y1) becomes943
very small when y1 is far less than 0. When y1 → −∞,944
we have lim
y1→−∞
Pr(X = x|Y1 = y1) = 0 and lim
y1→−∞
Pr(X =945
x|Y1 = y1) = 1. Therefore, (56) can be reduced to946
fY2|X(Y2 = y2|X = x; fV |U ,h)947
= f0Y2|X(Y2 = y2|X = x;g). (58)948
Substituting (53) and (54) into (58), we can obtain K = grd,949
which means that fY2|X(y2|x; fV |U ,h) can be expressed only950
by the known unreliable CSI.951
In addition, since the direct link S-D and the relay link952
S-R-D are independent of each other, we have953
fY1,Y2|X(y1, y2|x; fV |U ,h))954
= fY1|X(y1|x)fY2|X(y2|x; fV |U ,h)955
=
1
π(K2σ2sr + σ2rd)σ
2
sd
956
× exp
(
−‖y1 − hsdx‖
2
σ2sd
− ‖y2 − gsrKx‖
2
K2σ2sr + σ2rd
)
957
=
1
π(g2rdσ2sr + σ
2
rd)σ
2
sd
958
× exp
(
−‖y1 − hsdx‖
2
σ2sd
− ‖y2 − gsrgrdx‖
2
g2rdσ
2
sr + σ2rd
)
. (59)959
On the other hand, according to (54), we have960
f0Y1,Y2|X(y1, y2|x;g)961
= fY1|X(y1|x)f0Y2|X(y2|x;g)962
=
1
π(g2rdσ2sr + σ
2
rd)σ
2
sd
963
× exp
(
−‖y1 − hsdx‖
2
σ2sd
− ‖y2 − gsrgrdx‖
2
g2rdσ
2
sr + σ2rd
)
. (60)964
From (59) and (60), we see that fY1,Y2|X(y1, y2|x; fV |U ,h) =965
f0Y1,Y2|X(y1, y2|x;g), which completes the proof of966
Proposition 2.967
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